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This is a substantially revised version of an earlier Working Paper (posted in 2002, with a different
title), based on much new data and other information.  It re-examines Earl Hamilton’s famous 1929 thesis
on ‘Profit Inflation’ and the ‘birth of modern industrial capitalism’: namely, that the inflationary forces of the
Price Revolution era produced a widening gap between prices and wages, thus providing industrial
entrepreneurs with windfall profits, which they reinvested in larger-scale, more capital intensive forms of
industry. Hamilton’s analyses of price and wage data for 16
th- and 17
th-century Spain, France, and England
led him to conclude that:  Spain had enjoyed virtually no ‘profit inflation’, since wages had generally kept
pace with prices; and that early-modern England had experienced the greatest degree of such ‘profit inflation’.
Such a contrast in their national economic experiences helps to explain, in Hamilton’s view, why Spain
subsequently ‘declined’, while England became the homeland of the modern Industrial Revolution. A major
reason for the significance and fame of the Hamilton thesis was its enthusiastic endorsement by John Maynard
Keynes, in his Treatise of Money, published the following year, in 1930.  Subsequently, the Hamilton ‘profit
inflation’ thesis was subjected to severe attacks: by John Nef (1936-37) and David Felix (1956).  But they
had to rely on the same dubious and indeed often untrustworthy price and wage data for England and France
(and of course on Hamilton’s data for Spain, which was of much higher quality).  Both rightly noted that the
proper comparison had to be made between industrial wages and industrial prices, not the price level in
general.  Since industrial prices generally rose less than did the overall price level (heavily weighted with
foodstuffs), they found much less evidence for ‘profit inflation’ than had Hamilton. Nef developed a counter
thesis to argue that sharply rising raw material costs, especially for wood and charcoal, forced industrialists
to devise new furnace technologies to burn coal instead of wood or charcoal: changes that not inly  reduced
such costs but resulted in much larger-scale, more capital-intensive forms of industry.  In this revised paper,
I offer new data to demonstrate that neither the ‘energy’ nor the new furnace technologies took place until
after the 1640s.
This study is based on newer sets of price and wage indices that appeared after their publications:
those by Phelps Brown and Hopkins for England (which I have modified, after using their data sheets in the
LSE Archives), and for this version, additional price date for England.  For the southern Netherlands, I have
utilized  Herman Van der Wee Consumer Price Index.  My analyses of both industrial prices and industrial
wages suggest that, for England, there is more evidence for potential ‘profit inflation’, in some industries,
than Nef or Felix had been willing to concede. But the major discovery was that the Antwerp region
continuously experienced, over the 16
th and 17
th centuries, the contrary phenomenon: what Keynes had called
‘Profit Deflation’ (for him, a truly negative force), in that industrial wages rose faster than industrial prices.
And yet indisputably the southern Netherlands had a much more industrialized and more rapidly growing
economy than did England, at least until the Revolt of the Netherlands (1568-1609). The concept of ‘profit
inflation’ is not, therefore, a useful analytical tool, if based only on labour costs.
This study concludes with a brief examination of the effects on inflation on two other factor costs:
land, in terms of real rents, and capital, in terms of real interest rates, which did fall with inflation. In all
likelihood both such costs did lag behind industrial prices in early-modern England and the Low Countries
(and contrary to Eric Kerridge’s 1953 assertions on English rents), though real interest rates lagged more than
did real rents.  While disputing the Nef thesis, I do analyse the forms and nature of other new, larger-scale
industries in this era (mining, metallurgy shipbuilding).  I also provide a new appendix on the role of coinage
debasements, as an another important monetary factor in determining regional differences in inflation rates;
and this contradicts the almost universal assumption that debasements were irrelevant.
JEL Classifications:  B2, E2, E3, J3, N1, N3, O1, O51 See John H.  Munro, ‘Classic Review of Earl Hamilton, American Treasure and the Price
Revolution in Spain, 1501-1650 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1934. xii + 428 pp.). Subtitled:
Hamilton and the Price Revolution: A Revindication of His Tarnished Reputation and of a Modified Quantity
Theory of Money’.  Reviewed for EH.NET BOOK REVIEW, <eh.net-review@eh.net> on 15 January 2007.
This review is archived at EH.NET, at this web site: http://eh.net/bookreviews/library/munro.  See also John
Munro,  ‘Price Revolution’, in  Steven N. Durlauf and Lawrence E. Blume, eds., The New Palgrave
Dictionary of Economics, 2
nd edition, 6 vols. (London and New York:  Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), vol.  6,
pp.  631-34; and John Munro, ‘The Monetary Origins of the “Price Revolution:”   South German Silver
Mining, Merchant-Banking, and Venetian Commerce, 1470-1540’, in Dennis Flynn, Arturo Giráldez, and
Richard von Glahn, eds., Global Connections and Monetary History, 1470 - 1800  (Aldershot and Brookfield,
Vt:  Ashgate Publishing, 2003),  pp. 1-34; John Munro, ‘Inflation’, in Jonathan Dewald, et al, eds., Europe,
1450-1789: Encyclopedia of the Early Modern World  (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons/The Gale Group,
2004), Vol. 3, pp. 262-265; and John Munro, ‘Money and Coinage: Western Europe’, in Jonathan Dewald,
et al, eds., Europe, 1450-1789: Encyclopedia of the Early Modern World (New York: Charles Scribner’s
Sons/The Gale Group, 2004), Vol. 4, pp. 174-184.  See the next note.
2  The fundamental publications by Earl J. Hamilton are:  ‘American Treasure and Andalusian Prices,
1503-1660: A Study in the Spanish Price Revolution’, Journal of Economic and Business History, 1
(February 1928), 1-35, reprinted in P.H. Ramsey, ed., The Price Revolution in Sixteenth-Century England
(London, 1971), pp. 147-81;  ‘American Treasure and the Rise of Capitalism, 1500-1700’, Economica, 27
(Nov. 1929), 338-57;  ‘Imports of American Gold and Silver into Spain, 1503-1660’, Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 43 (1929), 436-72; American Treasure and the Price Revolution in Spain, 1501-1650
(Cambridge, Mass., 1934; reissued 1965); Money, Prices, and Wages in Valencia, Aragon, and Navarre, 1351
- 1500 (Cambridge, Mass., 1936);  ‘Revisions in Economic History VIII: The Decline of Spain’, Economic
History Review, 1
st ser., 8:2 (May 1938), 168-79;  reprinted in E.M. Carus-Wilson, ed., Essays in Economic
History, 3 vols (London: 1954-62), vol. I, pp. 215-26;  War and Prices in Spain, 1651-1800 (Cambridge,
Mass: Harvard University Press, 1947)  ‘Profit Inflation and the Industrial Revolution, 1751-1800’, Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 56:2 (February 1942), 256-73; reprinted in F.C. Lane and J.C. Riemersma, eds.,
Enterprise and Secular Change: Readings in Economic History (London, 1953), pp. 322-49; and  ‘Prices as
Money, Prices, Wages, and ‘Profit Inflation’ in Spain, the Southern Netherlands, and England during
the Price Revolution era: ca. 1520 - ca. 1650
John H. Munro
University of Toronto
***************************************
Introduction: Hamilton, ‘Profit Inflation’, and the Historiography of the Price Revolution
In the twentieth-century historiography of the early-modern Price Revolution, and especially  of its
Spanish connections, no economic historian is more renowned – and indeed more controversial – than the
late Earl Hamilton (1899-1989). His fame rests on two theses. The first is his explanation of that Price
Revolution, in terms of the Quantity Theory of Money:  that the long, sustained era of inflation, from the early
sixteenth to the mid seventeenth century, was  fundamentally the product of monetary factors.  Of these the
most important,  though only from the 1550s, was the vast influx of treasure (gold and silver) from the
Spanish Americas, above all, the silver from the mines of Potosí in modern-day Bolivia (then Peru) and
Zacatecas, in Mexico.
1 
The second concerns the principal consequences of that Price Revolution: so-called ‘profit inflation’,
which he saw as the fundamental instrument in the birth of modern industrial capitalism.
2  His theories have,2
a Factor in Business Growth: Prices and Progress’,  Journal of Economic History, 12:4 (Autumn 1952), 325-
49.  This was his Presidential Address to the 12
th Annual Meeting of the Economic History Association.  
3  See above n.  1, and below, nn. 23-34, and n. 52.
4  See note 2 above.  Spanish-American imports into Seville had reached their peak, at a quinquennial
mean of 273,704.54 kg.  in 1591-95; then fell to a mean of 206,045.26 kg.  in 1626-60; and to a mean of just
27,965.33  kg.  in 1656-60, after which bullion imports were no longer taxed, and thus no longer recorded.
See Munro, ‘Monetary Origins’, Table 1.2, pp.  4-5.
5 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations [1776], ed. with
introduction by Edwin Cannan and Max Lerner, Modern Library Edition (New York, 1937), p. 34: ‘the
discovery of the mines of America diminished the value of gold and silver in Europe’.
6 See George A. Moore, ed., The Response of Jean Bodin to the Paradoxes of Malestroit and The
Paradoxes, translated from the French Second Edition, Paris 1578 ( Washington, 1946).  See also Jean-Yves
Le Branchu, ed., Écrits notables dur la monnaie, XVIe siècle: De Copernic à Davanzati reproduits, traduits,
d’après les éditions originales et les manuscrits, avec une introduction, des notices et des notes, Collection
des principaux économistes, nouvelle édition, 2 vols. (Paris, 1934): Les paradoxes du Seigneur de
Malestroict, conseiller du Roy, et Maistre ordinaire de ses comptes, sur le faict des monnoyes, presentez à
sa Majesté, au mois de mars MDLXVI (Paris, 1566); La response de maistre Jean Bodin advocat en la cour
au paradoxe des monsieur de Malestroit touchant l’enchérissement de toutes choses et le moyen d’y remedier
(Paris, 1568).  As will be noted later, however, Bodin was not fully correct about the role of coinage
debasements in the Price Revolution. 
7  Marjorie Grice-Hutchinson, The School of Salamanca: Readings in Spanish Monetary Theory, 1544
- 1605 (Oxford, 1952): Appendix III, p. 95: ‘And even in Spain, in times when money was scarcer, saleable
of course, been subject to repeated attacks, and also to some unfair ridicule during the past seventy years.
3
A few brief comments need to be offered here on his first and most famous thesis.   First, in fairness
to this oft-maligned and sadly misunderstood scholar, he had also contended that, in the first half of the
sixteenth century, other monetary factors were probably more important than Spanish silver imports: in
particular,  the Central European silver-copper mining boom and also some unnamed ‘financial innovations’.
Regrettably, he failed to provide any  elaboration, let alone economic analyses, of these two other monetary
factors.  Second, for the first half of the seventeenth century, he contended that the role of Spanish issues of
copper vellon coinages was as important or even more important than the now diminishing influxes of
Spanish American silver in producing the inflation that continued up to the 1650s.
4 Just the same, the very
title of his famous monograph  –  American Treasure and the Price Revolution in Spain  –  has led most
casual readers to believe that the ‘prime mover’ of that inflation was indeed ‘American treasure’. 
Hamilton, of course, was hardly the first to contend that the  the influx of Spanish American silver
had played such an important role in the European Price Revolution.  Adam Smith had said as much in his
famous Wealth of Nations (1776).
5 Even during the midst of the Price Revolution era itself, in 1568, the
renowned French philosopher Jean Bodin won a signal victory over his debate opponent, Jean Cherruyt de
Malestroit, in supposedly ‘demonstrating’ that  the current inflation of prices in France was due far more to
that Spanish silver influx than to any coinage debasements.
6   Less well known is an even earlier Spanish
publication, a treatise of 1556, by the cleric Azpilcueta Navarra, of the Salamanca School, which made
virtually the same contention about the role of Spanish American silver in the current rise of prices.
7  3
goods and labour were given for very much less than after the discovery of the Indies, which flooded the
country with gold and silver’.
8  Jack A. Goldstone, ‘Urbanization and Inflation: Lessons from the English Price Revolution of the
Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries’, American Journal of Sociology, 89 (1984), 1122-60; Jack A.
Goldstone’,The Causes of Long Waves in Early Modern Economic History’, in Joel Mokyr, ed., The Vital
One: Essays in Honor of Jonathan R. T. Hughes, Research in Economic History, Supplement no. 6,
(Greenwich, Conn., 1991), pp. 51 - 92; Jack A. Goldstone, ‘Monetary Versus Velocity Interpretations of the
‘Price Revolution’: A Comment’,  Journal of Economic History, 51:1 (March 1991): 176 - 81; Peter Lindert,
‘English Population, Wages, and Prices: 1541 - 1913’, The Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 15 (Spring
1985), 609 - 34. But see also critiques of these views in Michael D. Bordo, ‘Explorations in Monetary
History: A Survey of the Literature’, Explorations in Economic History, 23 (1986), 339-415.
9  See Munro, ‘Monetary Origins of the Price Revolution’ and other of my publications cited in n.
1 above.
Yet, as recent critics have correctly noted  — all of whom had not read Hamilton’s work carefully,
the influx of Spanish silver cannot have provided the initial causes of that long sustained inflation, because
it had commenced in Spain itself, the Low Countries, England, and elsewhere from about 1516-20, and thus
long before any significant importations of such silver, i.e., from the later 1550s (see graph A and Table 1).
 But most of these critics are just as incorrect in ascribing the fundamental causes to demographic factors
alone – for that is, quite simply,  bad economic theory.  
To be sure, population growth did play some important roles, especially in influencing relative price
changes (i.e., in particular, in explaining why grain, timber, and wood-fuel prices rose more than other prices
during this era).  In terms of the modernized income-version of the so-called Quantity Theory, the
consequences of demographic changes, especially those inducing structural changes in the economy, are
reflected in two of the variables in the Equations of Exchange: M.V = P. y (income velocity equation) and
M = k.P.y (cash balances equation). For population growth, in conjunction with many other ‘real’ factors,
clearly had an influence on the real variable y  (net national income at constant prices), and thus on the
economy’s ability or capacity to expand in response to increasing monetized aggregate demand (i.e., in terms
of  the elasticities of  supply in the various economic sectors). And, as both Jack Goldstone and Peter Lindert
have contended, demographically-induced structural changes in urbanization, market structures, and payments
systems may also have increased V – the income velocity of high-powered money; or conversely, in reducing
the variable k: i.e., the demand to hold real cash balances (influenced by real interest rates).
8
Nevertheless, monetary forces do remain fundamental in any complete explanation of the Price
Revolution. The initial monetary forces responsible for instigating the onset of the Price Revolution in the
early sixteenth-century were, as Hamilton himself actually suggested (two of them), and as I have argued at
great length, elsewhere, a combination of three factors:  (1) the South German silver-copper mining boom
(c. 1460-c.1535), which culminated in the 1530s,  (2) structural changes in Mediterranean trade, with
Ottoman conquests,  that diverted more and more of the new silver flows away from the Levant to north-west
Europe, from 1517; and (3) a veritable ‘financial revolution’, with the introduction of fully negotiable credit
instruments, in the 1530s, in private and public finance, producing a dramatic expansion in the effective
stocks and flows of European money supplies.
9  Subsequently, and certainly from the 1550s, the influx of
Spanish American silver quite clearly served to add a more powerful fuel to the ongoing inflationary forces
in the European economy, as did coinage debasements (and, in Spain, especially issues of copper vellon).
Again, in this respect, Hamilton was perfectly correct. Though the interminable debate about the causes of
the European ‘Price Revolution’ are not the focus of this study, some basic knowledge of both the monetary4
10  See John Munro, ‘The Central European Mining Boom, Mint Outputs, and Prices in the Low
Countries and England, 1450 - 1550’, in Eddy H.G. Van Cauwenberghe, ed.,  Money, Coins, and Commerce:
Essays in the Monetary History of Asia and Europe (From Antiquity to Modern Times), Studies in Social and
Economic History, Vol. 2 (Leuven, 1991), pp. 119 - 83; John Munro, ‘Precious Metals and the Origins of the
Price Revolution Reconsidered: The Conjuncture  of Monetary and Real Forces in the European Inflation of
the Early to Mid-Sixteenth Century’, in  Clara Eugenia Núñez, ed.,  Monetary History in Global Perspective,
1500 - 1808, Proceedings of the Twelfth International Economic History Congress at Madrid, August 1998
(Seville, 1998), pp.  35-50; and Munro, ‘The Monetary Origins of the Price Revolution’, pp. 1-34; and
Munro, ‘Price Revolution’, pp.  631-34, and other publications cited in n.  1, above.
11  These price index numbers are taken from E.  J.  Hamilton,  American Treasure and the Price
Revolution in Spain, 1501-1650 (Cambridge, Mass., 1934; reissued 1965); and are further analyzed in nn. 22-
24, and 53, below.  Although Hamilton produced two more monographs on Spanish price history, for 1351-
1500, and for 1651-1800 (see n.  2 above for the references), and although these also contained price indexes,
he used totally different bases for each, without providing historians with the statistical means of splicing
them together into one consecutive series.
12  For purposes of temporal and spatial comparisons, Table 1 also includes the price indexes for
Flanders, Brabant, and England, for the previous century: from 1401-05 to 1496-1500 (when the Flemish
price data cease: see the sources for Table 1).  For this century, the traditional statistical base of 1451-75=
100, has been used: i.e., that used to construct the Phelps Brown & Hopkins ‘basket of consumables’ price
index for England, and the Van der Wee Composite Price Index for Brabant (see nn.  25 and 28 below, and
Table 7).  Because we do not have comparable price indexes for Spain before 1500, I had to use a base period
of 1501-10: i.e., for the first decade of Hamilton’s price data series.  For reasons explained in the previous
and real forces involved in producing that inflation is essential for comprehending its economic and social
consequences, as elaborated in the following discussion.
10
Prices in Spain, England, and Brabant, 1501 - 1650: the important role of coinage debasements
In considering the economic consequence of the inflationary Price Revolution, the economic historian
must ask and answer three fundamental questions: (1) to what extent was that  inflation a general European
phenomenon; or was it just regional?  (2) when did it begin and when did it end: thus, how long did it last?
(3) What national or regional variations may be found for the entire era of the Price Revolution?  We may
answer these question with some statistical accuracy for only three West European countries or regions, for
the period 1501 to 1650: Spain (chiefly Castile); the southern Netherlands (Hapbsburg Low Countries); and
southern England.   For only in these three regions have the archives provided sufficient data on a wide range
of prices, and on an annual basis, to permit the construction on Consumer Price Indexes.  Furthermore, only
these three regions have also provided sufficient mint and monetary data.
For each of these regions,  the decade 1501-10 has been chosen as the base period: so that all the
index numbers  for each quinquennium (five-year mean), for these three countries, represent its percentage
value of the base period.  Thus an index number of 120 means that the price-level, or the composite consumer
price, was 20 percent higher than that of the base period.  The period chosen for comparing price levels in
these three countries is 1501-1650: and that choice was determined by E.  J.  Hamilton’s construction of his
composite price index for Spain, with no comparable data before 1500 and none after 1650.
11  
Table 1 and Graph A indicate that the Price Revolution was quite evidently a European-wide and not
a local phenomenon; and that in all three countries it began in the years 1516-20 and ended in the 1650s.
125
note, the Spanish price indexes in this  table, necessarily based on Hamilton’s Spanish price index, do not go
beyond 1650; but the price data given in War and Prices in Spain, 1651-1800 (see n.  2 above) do indicate,
as do the sources for the price history of Brabant and England, that prices began to fall after the 1650s.
13 See my evidence in my online review of: ‘David Hackett Fischer, The Great Wave: Price
Revolutions and the Rhythm of History (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1996)’, reviewed
for EH.Net Review <ehreview@eh.net>, 24 February 1999.  This review is archived at EH.NET, at this web
site: http://eh.net/bookreviews/library/0146
14  See the sources for Tables 1-7.
15  See below, pp.  000
Thus the Price Revolution, as an era of generally sustained, continuous inflation, lasted about 130 years; and
there is no other period in European economic history that demonstrates an inflation enduring so long.
13
Nevertheless, this table and graph together do reveal some fascinating regional differences in the
extent of the European Price Revolution.  Over this period, from 1501-10 to 1646-50,  the quinquennial mean
Consumer Price Index (CPI) rose the most in the  southern Low Countries (Brabant):  from 104.43 to 845.07-
an 8.09 fold increase.  Southern England experienced an intermediate rise in its quinquennial mean CPI:  from
101.43 to  697.54  - a 6.88 fold increase.  Thus, surprisingly,  Spain experienced the least extensive rise in
its CPI, yet clearly an inflationary increase:  from a mean of 92.43 to one of  343.36, when based solely on
a silver-coinage price index – just a 3.71 fold increase ;  but to a final quinquennial mean of 457.09 (a 4.95
fold increase), when based on a copper vellon prices index,  with a growing divergence only from 1598, for
reasons to be explained below. 
14
Surely, many historians will find it strange to discover that the Price Revolution was so much more
muted in Spain than in these other two countries.  As already demonstrated, however, and contrary to the still
‘conventional wisdom’,  the Price Revolution did not begin with the influx of Spanish American treasure. The
forms or nature and the  impact of the various monetary and real  forces obviously differed in all three
countries, because of varying local economic circumstances.
One of the most important monetary differences surprisingly involved coinage debasements, which
indeed largely explains the differences between these three national price trends.  For, indeed, Jean Bodin was
not fully correct in his supposed refutation of Malestroit’s thesis concerning the role of coinage debasements,
despite the unquestioned importance of Spanish silver for western Europe as a whole, from the mid-sixteenth
to mid-seventeenth centuries.  As important as this topic is to understanding the forms and nature of the Price
Revolution, most readers will probably not welcome a long digression on the complex and arcane subject of
coinage debasements; and therefore this topic has been reserved for an appendix to this article.
15 In summary:
one may conclude  that the Price Revolution was indeed a European-wide inflation, essentially a monetary
phenomenon, but one with national or regional variations that were the products of both local coinage
debasements and, to a possibly lesser extent,  the behaviour of particular real factors in each local economy.
Hamilton, Keynes, and the ‘Profit Inflation’ Debate
The more interesting questions concern the economic consequences of that inflation, especially in
terms of what Hamilton called ‘profit inflation’, in the form of a widening gap between prices and industrial
wages.  But Hamilton failed to make clear whether he meant the general price level or some particular set of
prices. Inflation and its opposite, deflation, are usually measured by the movement of some form of price6
16  For example, see J.D. Gould, ‘The Price Revolution Reconsidered’, Economic History Review,
2nd ser., 17:2 (1964-5), 249-66;   reprinted in Ramsey, Price-Revolution in Sixteenth-Century England,  pp.
91-116 (see n.  2 above).  In her view of  Frank Spooner, The International Economy and Monetary
Movements in France, 1493-1725 (Cambridge, Mass., 1972), in The Journal of European Economic History,
3: 1 (Spring 1974), 253, Anna Jacobson Schwartz commented that: ‘the author subscribes to a familiar
fallacy, namely that a monetary explanation to be valid requires that all prices move in unison’.
17   See John H.  Munro, ‘Wage-Stickiness, Monetary Changes, and Real Incomes in Late-Medieval
England and the Low Countries, 1300 - 1500:  Did Money Matter?’ Research in Economic History, 21
(2003), 185 - 297.
index, as a weighted average of prices for a group of selected commodities.  Some historians have fallaciously
contended that, if and when monetary forces produce an inflation, they should act equally on all prices.   But
any examination of the several available price indices for the European economy, from medieval to modern
times, shows that the prices of its component commodities  virtually never moved in tandem.
16 
The irregular behaviour of such individual prices is not just due to the fact that, as noted earlier,
changes in demographic and various other real factors had an almost continuous, if regionally varying, impact
in altering relative or individual prices. For concurrent monetary changes themselves frequently also
influenced such  changes.   In particular, distributions of increased money stocks, regionally or nationally,
may have benefited some economic sectors more than others, thus allowing some groups or socio-economic
strata to gain relatively greater increases in money incomes.  By their impact on price and income elasticities
of demand and thus also on elasticities of supply of commodities so demanded, the consequent changes in
their savings and expenditure patterns would have subsequently altered the relative prices of a wide variety
of individual goods and services.  The short-run supply of grains in early-modern Europe, for example, was
far less elastic than was the supply of various textiles, so that increased monetized demand would have led
(as indeed recorded) to greater price increases for grains than for woollen or linen cloth (see graphs D and
H).  Furthermore, if wages and other money incomes for the lower and middle classes did not rise
proportionately with the general level of prices, many such persons, facing household budget constraints,
would have been forced to spend proportionately more of their reduced real incomes on foodstuffs, fuels, and
other necessities, and thus proportionately less on many industrial goods (or more luxurious foodstuffs),
thereby reducing the relative demand for such goods, which in turn would have led to a fall in their relative
prices (if not in their current or nominal money prices).
Labour, of course, is one of those commodities (or providers of service) whose price, in the form of
wages, generally did not rise in tandem with the Consumer Price Index.  The population growth that
accompanied such periods of inflation, especially before the era of modern industrialization (i.e., before the
1860s), provided one major and obvious demographic reason for that differential between prices and wages:
a relatively more abundant supply of readily available labour and an adverse change in the land:labour ratio,
presumably leading to a fall in the marginal productivity of agricultural labour – a subject requiring further
analysis -- and thus (supposedly) in the real wage.  Another reason for this price-wage gap is ‘wage-
stickiness’, especially for institutional money wages involving either implicit or explicit contracts.
17
To be sure, that phenomenon seems to have manifested a greater rigidity during deflationary eras.
As Keynes rightly observed:  ‘Every trade union will put up some resistance to a cut in money-wages,
however small...’, but ‘no trade union would dream of striking on every occasion of a rise in the cost of
living’, unless, of course, the gap between money wages and rising wages became severe enough to produce7
18  John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (London, 1936),
pp. 14-15. Preceded by this sentence: ‘Thus it is fortunate that the workers, though unconsciously, are
instinctively more reasonable economists than the classical school, inasmuch as they resist reductions of
money-wages, which are seldom or never of an all-round character, even though the existing real equivalent
of those wages exceeds the marginal disutility of the existing employment; whereas they do not resist
reductions of real wages, which are associated with increases in aggregate employment and leave relative
money-wages unchanged, unless the reduction proceeds so far as to threaten a reduction of the real wage
below the marginal disutility of the existing volume of employment.’
19 See n. 1 above.
20  John Maynard Keynes, A Treatise on Money, two vols. (London, 1930), vol. II, pp. 152–63, esp.
pp. 154-5: ‘But it is the teaching of this Treatise that the wealth of nations is enriched, not during Income
Inflations during Profit Inflations – at times, that is to say, when prices are running away from costs. We
must, therefore, turn to the course of wages (as the only available indication of the movement of costs.)’ He
also stated, however, that Hamilton’s presentation of wage data, if ‘convincing’ for Spain, ‘must surely
overstate the case’ for England and France. Nevertheless, he states on pp. 158-59 that ‘we may say that Profit
Inflation in Spain lasted from 1520 to 1590, in England from 1550 to 1650, and in France from 1539 to 1700
(with a serious depression intervening from 1600 to 1625)’; and on p. 163: ‘It is unthinkable that the
difference between the amount of wealth in France and England in 1700 and the amount in 1500 could ever
have been built up by Thrift alone. The intervening Profit Inflation which created the modern world was
surely worth while if we take a long view.’
21  Hamilton, ‘American Treasure’, pp. 356-57.
a drastic reduction in living standards.
18 
Thus most economists and economic historians would surely agree with Hamilton that, in general,
wage increases generally do lag behind rising consumer prices during inflationary eras  – past and present.
Hamilton himself first introduced this concept in a seminal article, published in 1929, on ‘American Treasure
and the Rise of Capitalism’.
19  The very next year, in his famed Treatise on Money, John Maynard Keynes
bestowed his blessing on this concept of ‘profit inflation’ and on its role as a positive stimulus promoting
industrial growth.   If Hamilton had not explicitly used this term, Keynes certainly did.
20
Any fair discussion of Hamilton’s thesis should commence by examining the exact words he used
in introducing this concept in his the aforementioned article.  After comparing a set of graphs and tables on
prices and wages in England, France, and Andalusia, for the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, he then
stated the following: 
21
Let us assume that of every 100,000 pounds’ worth of goods produced by a capitalist in
England or France at the beginning of the sixteenth century 60,000 went to wages, 20,000
to rent, and 20,000 to profits..... [It is not] unreasonable to suppose that at the close of the
sixteenth century the same product would have been sold for about 250,000 pounds; that
wages would not have amounted to more than 75,000; and, making the unreasonable
assumption that rents did not lag behind prices, not more than 50,000 pounds would have
gone to rent. Profits amounted to 125,000 pounds, or 100 per cent on the turnover. The lag
of wages behind prices has quadrupled profits.  The windfalls thus received, along with gains
from the East India trade, furnished the means to build up capital equipment, and the
stupendous profits obtainable supplied an incentive for the feverish pursuit of capitalistic8
22  Georg Wiebe, Zur Geschichte der Preisrevolution des XVI. und XVII. Jahrhunderts, Staats- und
sozialwissenschaftliche Beiträge, II:2 (Leipzig, 1895), largely based on price data in James E. Thorold
Rogers, A History of Agriculture and Prices in England, from the Year after the Oxford Parliament (1259)
to the Commencement of the  Continental War (1793), Compiled. Entirely From Original and
Contemporaneous Records., 7 vols (Oxford, 1866-1902), especially vols. IV and V; Comte d’Avenel,
Histoire économique de la propriété, des salaires, des denrées, et de tous prix en général, 7 vols. (Paris, 1894
- 1926).
23  Hamilton, ‘American Treasure and Andalusian Prices’, 1-35 (see n.  2 above)
24   In Hamilton, American Treasure, see Table 27 (p. 271): ‘Composite Index Numbers of Money
Wages, 1501-1650’; Table 29 (p. 278): ‘Composite Index Numbers of Real Wages, 1501 - 1650 (‘obtained
by dividing the indices of money wages in Table 27 by the composite index numbers of commodity prices’);
and Appendix VIII: ‘Composite Index Numbers of Silver Prices, 1501-1650’.  He did not provide any
indication, however, of how the index was weighted (if at all).  All provinces but Valencia used a money-of-
account and coinage based on the maravedís, which contained an unvarying amount of fine silver, 0.094
gram, from 1501 to 1602.  The coinage and money-of-account of Valencia was based on the diner, which,
from 1501 to 1609, contained an unvarying amount of fine silver: 0.1389.  Thereafter, Spain adopted a copper
or vellon coinage, whose inflationary impact produced a premium or agio on the fine silver coinage, whose
values Hamilton presented in Table 7 and Chart 4, for the years 1620- 1650, on pp. 95-97: ranging from 4.0
percent in 1620 to 104.2 percent in 1650, then falling to 25.0 percent and rising again to 44.9 percent in 1650.
He did not, however, provide a table for vellon price indices for the period 1601-50; and such indices have
to be computed by dividing his real wages indices by the money wage indices for this period (and that
technique for the period 1501-1600 produces results virtually identical to those in his Composite Index
Numbers of Silver Prices, in Appendix VIII.  All of these tables used the base 1581=90 = 100, which I have
converted to the base 1501-10 = 100.  Graph A and Tables 1 and 6, in this study, present prices in both silver
and vellon.
enterprise.
Prices in Spain, England, and Brabant, 1501 - 1650: a critical analysis of the price statistics
Hamilton’s graphs and tables for prices and wages in England and France, in sharp contrast to his
fully and carefully researched data for Spain, were based on studies now regarded as far too imperfect to be
useful for current research: for England, those by Georg Wiebe, compiled from data published by James A.
Thorold Rogers; and for France, those by le Vicomte d’Avenel.
22  In his 1929 article on ‘American Treasure
and the Rise of Capitalism’, Hamilton’s Spanish data were based on a set of Andalusian prices that he himself
had published the previous year.
23   Subsequently, in his famed monograph, American Treasure and the Price
Revolution in Spain, 1501-1650 (1934), Hamilton expanded the presentation of his Spanish price data to
include as well those from New Castile, Old Castile-Léon, and Valencia; and, from those, he produced
composite price and money wage indices for Spain as a whole.
24   
About twenty years after that publication appeared a far superior set of wage and price indices for
southern England, in two now famous articles by Henry Phelps Brown and Sheila Hopkins, in 1955 and 1956,
subsequently republished in a collection of the former’s essays, A Perspective on Wages and Prices (London,
1981), which  contains  additional statistical appendices – the sub-indices for six groups of commodities –9
25  E.H. Phelps Brown and Sheila V. Hopkins, ‘Seven Centuries of Building Wages’, Economica, 22
(August 1955), reprinted in E.M. Carus-Wilson, ed., Essays in Economic History, 3 vols. (London, 1954-62),
Vol. II (1962), pp. 168-78.E.H. Phelps Brown and Sheila V. Hopkins, A Perspective of Wages and Prices
(London, 1981), pp. 1- 12; E.H. Phelps Brown and S.V. Hopkins, ‘Seven Centuries of the Prices of
Consumables Compared with Builders’ Wage-Rates’, Economica, 23 (Nov. 1956), reprinted in E.M.
Carus-Wilson, ed., Essays in Economic History, Vol. II, pp. 179-96; in Peter Ramsey, ed., The Price
Revolution (London, 1971), pp. 18-41; and in  E.H. Phelps Brown and Sheila V. Hopkins, A Perspective of
Wages and Prices (London, 1981),  pp. 13-59.  The justification for their fixed  commodity weights in their
basket, especially for the base 1451-75=100 was taken from the account books of the Savernak household,
in Dorset, published in K.L. Wood-Legh, A Small Household of the Fifteenth Century (Manchester, 1956).
26  Sir William Beveridge, Prices and Wages in England from the Twelfth to the Nineteenth Centuries,
vol. I: Price Tables: Mercantile Era (London, 1939; republished London, 1965). No other volume was ever
published; and this volume regrettably contains no wage data.
27   Robert Doughty, ‘Industrial Prices and Inflation in Southern England, 1401-1640’,  Explorations
in Economic History, 12 (1975), 177-92. It contains fifteen products: bricks, slates, plain tiles, lime, iron,
lead, pewter, solder, woollen cloth, canvas, linen shirting, candles, charcoal, paper, and salt (with woollen
cloth given double weight). For the period 1500 - 1750, the Phelps Brown and Hopkins index contains six
products: charcoal, candles, oil, woollen cloth, canvas, and linen shirting. See Table 3 below.
28   Herman Van der Wee, ‘Prijzen en lonen als ontwikkelingsvariabelen: Een vergelijkend onderzoek
tussen Engeland en de Zuidelijke Nederlanden, 1400 - 1700’, in Album offert à Charles Verlinden à
l’occasion de ses trente ans de professoriat (Wetteren: Universum,  1975), pp. 413-35; reissued in English
translation (Lizabeth Fackelman) as: ‘Prices and Wages as Development Variables: A Comparison between
England and the Southern Netherlands, 1400-1700’, Acta Historiae Neerlandicae, 10 (1978), 58-78; and
republished in Herman Van der Wee, The Low Countries in the Early Modern World (Cambridge and New
York: Cambridge University Press; and Variorum: Ashgate Publishing, 1993), pp. 223-41. Only the original
Dutch publication contains tables with the annual price and wage data.  A more detailed series of wages and
not provided in the original publication, or in subsequent reprints.
25  Although also based to a considerable
extent on the price-data published by Thorold Rogers, Phelps Brown and Hopkins used his series with much
greater care, and also utilized, for the period after the 1560s, an even better source: William Beveridge’s price
data for early-modern England (much of it never published).
26  
I myself have utilized the working papers in both the Phelps Brown Papers Collection and the
Beveridge Price and Wage History Collection,  now housed in the British Library of Political and Economic
Science, to correct some compilation errors in their annual series and to interpolate missing data. For this
current study, I have also utilized an index of prices for English industrial goods compiled by Robert
Doughty, which contains  a somewhat greater variety of products than contained in the Phelps Brown and
Hopkins index (though his inclusion of salt is not necessarily helpful).
27
Unfortunately nobody has yet advanced upon the work of Comte d’Avenel to present a better and
more reliable set of price and wage indices for France; and for that reason, France has been omitted from this
current study. An excellent, and in some respects, an even better replacement is now available for the southern
Low Countries, from 1400 to 1700: more specifically, the Antwerp-Lier-Brussels region of the duchy of
Brabant, in the southern Netherlands.  Essentially employing  the Phelps Brown and Hopkins set of price and
wage indices as his model, Professor Herman Van der Wee published these indices, originally in a Dutch-
language essay, in 1975.
28   While containing fewer commodities than the Phelps Brown and Hopkins index,10
prices, though only to 1600, were published earlier in Herman Van der Wee, The Growth of the Antwerp
Market and the European Economy, 14th - 16th Centuries, 3 vols.  (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,  1963),
Vol. I: Statistics.  For a further justification of the commodity weights in his ‘basket’, see Herman Van der
Wee, ‘Voeding en Dieet in het Ancien Régime’, Spiegel Historiael, 1 (1966), 94-101, republished in
translation: as ‘Nutrition and Diet in the Ancien Régime’, in Herman Van der Wee, The Low Countries in the
Early Modern World , trans. by Lizabeth Fackelman (Cambridge and New York, 1993), pp. 279-87.   See also
Table 7 below.
29  From 1434-35, with the monetary unification of the Burgundian Low Countries, the Brabantine
money-of-account, in ponden groot, became tied to the Flemish pond groot in a permanently fixed ratio of
1.5:1, so that 30s groot Brabant = 20s or 1 pond groot Brabant, until 1792.   See  Van der Wee, Growth of
the Antwerp Market, Vol. I, Table XIII, pp. 123-25;  John Munro, Wool, Cloth, and Gold:  The Struggle for
Bullion in Anglo-Burgundian Trade, 1340-1478 (Brussels and Toronto, 1973),  pp. 99-103; John Munro,
‘Mint Outputs, Money, and Prices in Late-Medieval England and the Low Countries’, in Eddy Van
Cauwenberghe and Franz Irsigler, eds., Münzprägung, Geldumlauf und Wechselkurse/ Minting, Monetary
Circulation and Exchange Rates, Trierer Historische Forschungen, vol. 7 (Trier, 1984), pp. 31-122.
30 See n.  50 below.
31  See a more detailed analysis of the two baskets, with all their commodities, in Table 7 below. The
Phelps Brown and Hopkins index contains fourteen commodities:  wheat, rye, barley, and peas (farinaceous
group); sheep, butter, cheese, red and white herrings (meat-dairy-fish group); charcoal, candles, and oil (fuel
and light group); and woollen cloth, canvas, and linen shirting (textiles group).  As the Phelps Brown working
papers reveal, butter and cheese prices are missing from 1430 to 1561; but their Table 2, in ‘Seven Centuries
of the Prices of Consumables’, p. 20,  showing the structure of their four ‘commodity baskets’ erroneously
suggests that butter and cheese are entirely absent for the basket labelled 1500-1725. The Van der Wee index
contains ten commodities: rye (for grains), beef, cheese, butter, and herrings (for the meat-dairy-fish
grouping); barley (for barley-malt, for the drink group); charcoal and tallow candles (fuel and light); and
woollen and linen cloth (textiles).
his Consumer Price Index presents not just the index numbers, but actual annual prices and wages, given in
terms of Brabant’s silver coinage based money-of-account, in deniers groot. 
29 We may thus present the
annual values of the Van der Wee ‘Basket of Consumables’ in these monetary terms and then compute how
many of these baskets a master mason or carpenter, working about 210 days a year, could have purchased
with the annual sum of his money wage income. 
30
For his base period of 1451-75, the same one used in the Phelps Brown and Hopkins ‘basket of
consumables’ index, Van der Wee utilized very similar weights, but he chose the weights on the basis of the
physical quantities in the Phelps Brown & Hopkins index, rather than on the percentage weights that the latter
had given to each commodity group.  While those commodity percentage weights remained fixed and frozen
throughout the span of the Phelps Brown and Hopkins index (1264-1954), they necessarily varied in the Van
der Wee index, over time, with major shifts in relative prices.  Thus, during the sixteenth and early
seventeenth centuries, when grain prices rose to a greater extent than did industrial prices, the share of the
value of the total basket for the farinaceous/grain sub-index consequently rose, as indeed did the aggregate
share for foodstuffs, while the percentage share for industrial goods correspondingly fell. In this respect, the
Van der Wee composite index better reflects the changing pattern of consumer expenditures during the Price
Revolution era than does the Phelps Brown and Hopkins index, as the following table A demonstrates.
31
Table A:  A Comparison of the Commodity Component Weights in the Phelps Brown & Hopkins11
32  See, however, the  index numbers for a ‘composite unit of consumables’ in Alsace, from 1401 to
1700 (1451-75=100), published in E. Henry Phelps Brown and Sheila Hopkins, ‘Wage-Rates and Prices:
Evidence for Population Pressure in the Sixteenth Century’, in Economica, 24:97 (November 1957),
289-305;  republished in Phelps Brown and Hopkins, A Perspective of Wages and Prices (London, 1981),
pp. 60-77, Table 2 (pp. 74-75), based L’Abbé A. Hanauer, Études économiques sur l’Alsace ancienne et
moderne, 2 vols. (Paris, 1876-78), vol. II.  Alsace, part of modern France, was then part of the duchy of
Lorraine within the German Habsburg Empire, until 1648 (Treaty of Westphalia). Hanauer’s prices were
quoted in terms of the 19
th century French franc (with 4.5 grams silver), which the authors converted ‘to an
index of prices expressed in the denier of the unit of account, by use of Table III, of Monnaies
Stasbourgeoises’ (Vol. I, pp. 496-97). While there may have been no other option, such a technique would
not likely produce accurate current money-of-account prices. In Table 3, p. 76, they also provide quarter-
century mean index numbers for a similar ‘composite basket of consumables’, again based on d’Avenel’s data
(but taken from Séances et travaux de l’Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques: Compte Rendu (Paris,
1892), pp. 349-419. See also E. Henry Phelps Brown and Sheila Hopkins, ‘Builders’ Wage-Rates, Prices and
Population: Some Further Evidence’, Economica, 26:101 (February 1959), 18-38;  also republished in their
Perspective on Wages and Prices, pp. 78-98. It provides annual index numbers for a similar ‘composite
and Van der Wee Composite Price Indices (base: 1451-75 = 100)
Commodity Group Phelps Brown
& Hopkins
Basket, 1451-
75: percentage
weight (fixed)
Van der Wee
Basket, 1451-
75: percentage
weight
Van der Wee
Basket, 1501-
05: percentage
weight
Van der Wee
Basket, 1596-
1600:
percentage
weight
Farinaceous (grains, peas) 20.00 18.24 18.76 25.22
Meat and Fish 25.00 27.82 26.06 25.80
Dairy: Butter and Cheese 12.50 11.05 10.87 11.43
Drink: Barley malt 22.50 17.08 19.55 23.08
Fuel and Light 7.50 7.82 6.55 4.98
Textiles: Woollen &
Linens
12.50 18.00 18.20 9.49
Totals 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Sources: see the sources for Table 7
The Attacks on the Hamilton Thesis: John Nef (1936-37) and David Felix (1956)
It is thus important to note that the first two articles attacking the Hamilton-Keynes thesis of Profit
Inflation, and really the only two important ones, were published before these much more highly refined and
reliable wage and price series became available.   Indeed for England, the two major critics still had to rely
on their interpretations of the price and wage data from Thorold Rogers, principally via Georg Wiebe.   Since
France has been omitted from this current study, their views on the relevance of the Hamilton thesis to the
early-modern French economy, similarly based on the dubious d’Avenel data, will be largely ignored.
3212
basket’ and corresponding ‘real-wage’ indices for:  Valencia, from 1413 to 1607; Augsburg, from 1499 to
1753; and Vienna, from 1520 to 1720 (and decennial means for Münster, from 1501-10 to 1551-60). The
Valencia data were extracted from  the Hamilton’s two major monographs, cited in n.  2 above.  None of these
series, in either article, provides index numbers for industrial goods. A surprisingly useless source is: François
Simiand, Recherches anciennes et nouvelles sur le mouvement général des prix du XVIe au XIXe siècle, École
Pratique des Hautes Études, Section des Science historiques et philologiques, Conférences d’Histoire et
Statistique économiques, 1930-1932 (Paris, 1932). Not even a single table is contained in its text of 677 pp.
(crudely reproduced from a typescript); and the volume ends with a series of 16 hand-drawn graphs
portraying the price-indices produced by d’Avenel, Hanauer, Thorold Rogers, Hamilton, Jevons, and others.
His study has no new data. 
33  Published as:  John U. Nef, ‘Prices and Industrial Capitalism in France and England, 1540-1640’,
Economic History Review, 1st ser.,  7:2 (May 1937), 155-85; reprinted in both: E.M. Carus-Wilson,
ed., Essays in Economic History, Vol. I (London, 1954), pp. 108-34; and Frederic Lane and Jellie Riemersma,
eds., Enterprise and Secular Change (London, 1953), pp. 292-321. This article was partly based on his prior
research on industrial growth, previously published as: John U. Nef, ‘The Progress of Technology and the
Growth of Large-Scale Industry in Great Britain, 1540 - 1640', Economic History Review, 1
st ser., 5:1 (Oct.
1934), 3-24; also republished in Carus Wilson, ed., Essays in Economic History, Vol. I (London, 1954), pp.
88-107; and also John Nef, ‘A Comparison of Industrial Growth in France and England, 1540-1640’, Journal
of Political Economy, 44:5 (Oct. 1936), 643-66; reprinted in John Nef, Conquest of the Material World
(Chicago, 1964), pp. 144-212. See also John Nef, The Rise of the British Coal Industry, 2 vols. (London,
1923; reprinted 1966).  In particular, Vol. I, Part ii, ‘Coal and Industrialism’, pp. 133-264; and especially
Chapter 2, ‘An Early Industrial Revolution’, pp. 165-89; and John Nef, Industry and Government in France
and England, 1540-1640 (New York, 1940), which does not, however, deal with these theses.
34  See F.  J. Fisher, ‘Tawney’s Century’, in F.  J.  Fisher, ed.,  Essays in the Economic and Social
History of Tudor and Stuart England: in Honour of R.  H.  Tawney (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1961),  pp. 1-14. 
The first major assault came from Professor John Nef, in a paper that he delivered in London in July
1936 on the topic: ‘Prices and Industrial Capitalism in France and England, 1540 - 1640’.
33  He noted, first
of all, that from the presentation of the Hamilton’s tables, France appeared to have experienced a far greater
degree of ‘profit inflation’ than did England during this century (now known as ‘Tawney’s Century);
34  but
the historic record demonstrates instead that England then enjoyed much more industrial growth. One major
reason was this was that England was spared the horrendous wars that afflicted France: especially the  Wars
of Religion,  from 1562 to 1598 ; and subsequently  the Thirty Years War from 1618 to 1648 (wars far more
drastic and destructive than the English Civil Wars of the 1640s).  Not surprisingly, the intervening period
of relative peace also marked a major spurt of French industrial growth; but this was also a period in real
wages apparently rose in France, i.e., one in which ‘profit-inflation’ (if any) probably diminished. 
For England, Nef does admit that ‘there is certainly a remarkable coincidence between profit-
inflation, which reflects the fall in real wages, and the growth of industrial capitalism ... in the first three of
the four periods’ under consideration; i.e., up to about 1620 ( but not from then to the 1640s). His major
challenge lay in the contention that ‘more recent evidence’ on wages, that supplied by the Beveridge Price
History Commission,  indicate that money rates rose much more than indicated in Wiebe’s data.  In particular,
from 1571-82 to 1633-42, ‘they  rose more than 50 per cent’, while Wiebe’s data indicate a rise in daily13
35  Nef, ‘Prices and Industrial Capitalism’, p.  116.  The Beveridge LSE research project effectively
came to an end with the outbreak of World War II, when, as indicated in n.  26 above,  the one and only
volume was published.  While the early-modern wage data have never been published, Beveridge did publish
some medieval wage data in two articles:  William Beveridge, ‘Wages in the Winchester Manors’, Economic
History Review, 1
st ser., 7:1 (Nov.  1936), 22-43; William Beveridge, ‘Westminster Wages in the Manorial
Era’, Economic History Review, 2nd ser., 8:1 (1955), 18 - 35.  The voluminous wage data that I myself have
gleaned from the Beveridge Price and Wage History Collection (LSE) do not contradict the evidence on
wages published by Phelps Brown and Hopkins. See the next note.
36 Phelps Brown and Hopkins did utilize some of the unpublished Beveridge wage data, as well as
those from Thorold Rogers.  Nef also contended that some wage-earners received part of their pay in food
and drink from their employers; and that many possessed plots of land on which they could grow some food.
For some similar arguments, see also  Donald Woodward, ‘Wage Rates and Living Standards in Pre-Industrial
England’, Past and Present, No. 91 (May 1981), pp. 28-46.  The evidence on English wages that I have
examined indicate that most artisans received money wages alone; and the wage data used in the indices in
this study are those for money-wages alone.
37   In ‘Prices and Industrial Capitalism’, p. 118, Nef notes that herring prices rose to a somewhat
lesser degree than did building wages; and herrings do form part of the PB&H ‘basket of consumables’.  For
the technological changes and Nef’s thesis of ‘an early industrial revolution’ in Tudor-Stuart England,
involving the adoption of new coal-burning furnaces in particular, see  ‘The Progress of Technology and the
Growth of Large-Scale Industry’, pp. 88-107.  See also below, nn.  38-42 below.
38 Nef, ‘Prices and Industrial Capitalism’, p. 135. 
money wages of ‘only’ 39 percent.
35  
That contention is not fully supported by the publication of Phelps Brown and Hopkins’s data on
building wages, which, for this period, lie between the Wiebe and Nef estimates: in that money wages rose
from a quinquennial mean of 10.20d per day in 1571-75 to one of 14.90d in 1636-40, i.e., a rise of 46.1
percent.  As the subsequent analysis will reveal, this somewhat more generous estimate of the rise in money
wages for English building craftsmen does not really mitigate the very grim picture of sharply falling real
wages that not only Hamilton but many subsequent historians have portrayed for this era (see graph C and
Table 3).
36  Furthermore, Nef’s complaint that estimates of real wages were based almost entirely on cereal
products has been partly met by the much more diversified composition of the Phelps Brown and Hopkins
basket.  Admittedly, however, that basket still contains far more prices for raw materials (e.g., grains) than
for finished food products:  e.g., none for bread and beer.  These products, involving a much higher labour
component, very likely rose to a much lesser degree than the former  – especially, during this era, with
significant technological changes in both brewing and baking.
37   Nef concluded this part of his argument by
contending – as many others have since (including even Keynes) – that had ‘the standard of living among the
English working people really fallen by anything approaching half [50 percent – as indicated by Thorold
Rogers’s data], the advantages which employers derived from hiring labour cheaply might have been offset
by the reduction in the amount [that] workmen could have spent on manufactured goods’.
38
Nef’s major and certainly his most powerful argument is that even if real wages fell, or more
precisely the real cost of labour to the employer (see infra), other industrial costs were rising: in particular,
the cost of timber (a major industrial input) and especially the cost of wood-charcoal fuels.  In Nef’s view,
this dramatic rise or relative increase in wood-fuel prices presented many industrialists with a dangerous
price-cost squeeze that threatened them with poverty or extinction if they had not responded with cost-14
39 See n. 20 above.
40 In 7 vols. (Oxford, 1866-1902): in particular, see vol.  IV: (1401-1582), pp. 383-7; and vol. V
(1583-1702), pp. 398-402.
41 See John Munro,’Tawney’s Century (1540-1640): the Roots of Modern Capitalist
Entrepreneurship’, in William Baumol, David Landes, and Joel Mokyr, eds., A Global History of
Entrepreneurship: from Antiquity to Modern Times (Princeton: Princeton University Press, forthcoming).
The data in Table 8, below, in this article, are not reproduced as such in this Princeton volume, but rather in
the form of a graph.  Thus, this table is worth publishing here.
42 See in particular Donald C. Coleman, Industry in Tudor and Stuart England, Studies in Economic
and Social History (London: Macmillan, 1975), pp. 35-49; Donald C.  Coleman, The Economy of England,
1450 -1750 (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), pp.  69-90, 151-72; Sybil Jack, Trade
and Industry in Tudor and Stuart England (London, 1977), especially chapter 2, pp. 66-121; and Munro,
‘Tawney’s Century’ (see n.  41 above).  In defence of the Nef thesis, see  Brinley Thomas, ‘Was There an
Energy Crisis in Great Britain in the 17th Century?’ Explorations in Economic History, 23 (April 1986), 124
- 52; and Brinley Thomas,  ‘Escaping from Constraints:  The Industrial Revolution in a Malthusian Context’,
The Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 15:4 (Spring 1985), 729 - 54. reprinted in R. I. Rotberg and T. K.
Rabb, eds., Population and Economy:  Population and History from the Traditional to the Modern World
(Cambridge, 1986), pp. 729-54.  Implicitly supporting Nef are: John Hatcher, The History of the British Coal
Industry, vol.  I: Before 1700: Towards the Age of Coal (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1993); E. Anthony
Wrigley,  Continuity, Chance and Change:  The Character of the Industrial Revolution in England
reducing technological innovations. In his thesis,  the key innovations that did result in ‘an early industrial
revolution’ in later Tudor and early Stuart England (1540-1640)  – i.e., in ‘Tawney’s Century’.  
This supposed ‘industrial revolution’ principally involved  much more capital intensive, larger-scale
forms of industry; and the principal examples were those  were those that, experiencing a price-cost squeeze,
were forced to  create an entirely new furnace technology, based on relatively and ever cheaper coal fuels.
Since coal is a ‘dirty’ contaminating fuel – while charcoal is a pure-burning fuel – that new technology
required vastly more complex and thus much larger reverberatory furnaces, which isolated the combustion
of the fuels and its gases by reflecting the heat during the manufacturing processes:  in making bread, beer,
soap, glass, gunpowder, alum and dyestuff processing, metal-refining, etc.
39  
Although some seemingly impressive statistical evidence, chiefly drawn from J.  A.  Thorold Roger’s
still widely used History of Agriculture and Prices in England , 
40 can be used to support John Nef’s thesis,
my own recent compilation of a wide variety of English prices for wood, wood-charcoal, coal, and industrial
prices does not indicate any significant disparity between wood-charcoal and coal prices during ‘Tawney’s
Century, and not until after the 1640s. Only then does that disparity – increasingly favouring the use of coal
and then its purified form, coke –did  become increasingly pronounced, right into the early phase of the
Industrial Revolution, from the 1760s.  Those dramatic changes in relative prices can be seen in Table 8.
41
The Nef thesis has also come under considerable attack for many other reasons:  principally on the
grounds that the ‘new’ coal-burning manufacturing industries in the Tudor-Stuart era still formed only a very
small component of the English industrial economy, particularly in comparison with the various textile
industries (New and Old Draperies); furthermore,  that it provided virtually no new exports of any economic
significance;  and finally, that it did little to alter the overall structure of the still basically agrarian and textile-
based English economy. But this debate also lies well beyond the scope of this study.
4215
(Cambridge University Press, 1988);  E. Anthony Wrigley‘The Divergence of England: the Growth of the
English Economy in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries’, Transactions of the Royal Society, 6
th ser.,
10 (2000), 117-41; E. Anthony Wrigley, ‘The Transition to an Advanced Organic Economy: Half a
Millennium of English Agriculture’,  The Economic History Review, 2
nd ser., 59:3 (August 2006), 425-480.
For a contrary view, see Gregory Clark, and David Jacks,  ‘Coal and the Industrial Revolution, 1700 - 1869’,
European Review of Economic History, 11:1 (April 2007),  39-72. 
43 David Felix, ‘Profit Inflation and Industrial Growth: the Historic Record and Contemporary
Analogies’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 70:3 (August 1956), 441-63; republished in Roderick Floud,
ed., Essays in Quantitative Economic History (Oxford, 1974), pp. 133-51. It necessarily repeats but also
modifies Nef’s attack on Hamilton, while largely supporting Nef’s key arguments.
44 See n.  2 above. In his published Presidential Address, Hamilton does respond to Nef’s argument
(if  unconvincingly, by curtly and unfairly dismissing his evidence on timber prices); and he does admit (p.
338) that ‘it would be manifestly absurd to contend that the great lag of wages behind prices in England,
southern Germany, and perhaps France and other areas during the Price Revolution of the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries was solely responsible to the rise of modern capitalism.’ Nevertheless he also states that
‘it is difficult, however, to see how anything else could have been more important that the great lag of wages
behind prices in certain economically advanced countries during the Price Revolution. Capitalism required
capital, and it would not be easy to imagine a more powerful instrument for providing it than forced saving
through a highly favorable price-wage ratio.’ His article also deals with the modern Industrial Revolution era;
but overall provides little that is new for the debate.
45  Felix, ‘Profit Inflation’, pp. 441-43. He also deals with ‘contemporary analogies’ and notes that
the renowned economist and economic historian W. Arthur Lewis had made ‘a case for inflation in currently
underdeveloped countries’, citing his Aspects of Industrialization, National Bank of Egypt, Fiftieth
Commemoration Lectures (Cairo, 1953), pp. 15-19.
The next (and last major attack) on the Hamilton thesis on ‘profit inflation’ came in 1956 in a very
well argued article by David Felix in the prestigious Quarterly Journal of Economics.
43 By this time,
undaunted by Nef’s critique (and evidently still relishing Keynes’s support), Hamilton had published, in this
same journal (1942), another major article on the same theme, for a later era: ‘Profit Inflation and the
Industrial Revolution, 1751 - 1800’.  Finally, in 1952, the Journal of Economic History published his
Presidential Address (for the Economic History Association) in the article: ‘Prices as a Factor in Business
Growth: Prices and Progress’.
44 Felix necessarily deals with Hamilton’s views on the Industrial Revolution
era as well (and also those on France), which are beyond the purview of the study and hence will not be
discussed here.  In sum, Felix concludes that:
  industrial profit inflation is not much in evidence in the periods to which he refers ... [and]
it is even possible that it was nonexistent, although this may be too bold a counterclaim in
view of the gaps and obscurities in the evidence. But even if it did exist in a much reduced
degree, it does not appear to have been a decisive force in determining rates of industrial
growth’.  
His more particular and principal objection, after surveying the evidence, was that ‘there is no correlation
either between the degree of price inflation and the degree of profit inflation, or between the rates of profit
inflation and the apparent rates of industrial growth’.
45  We can take this argument as ‘given’ or settled and
not deal with it further, with one important exception.16
46 See Table 3, and its sources, below.
47  Felix, ‘Profit Inflation’, p. 446, and Tables I and II, also based on Wiebe’s data, in decennial
means,  but not consecutive, and for oddly defined periods (e.g., 1643-52). Felix also contends that profit
inflation  ‘disappears in such expanding industries as iron, textiles, and paper’, but that verdict cannot be
vindicated without some knowledge of the actual money wages – and other production costs – in these
industries. Felix is also, and naturally, sympathetic to Nef’s erroneous contention that Weibe’s money wage
index should be elevated by 20 percent.  See nn.  33-39 above.
48  The task of collecting, in terms of Spanish maravedís (silver-based money-of-account), industrial
prices for these four regions and then composing an national index, was too arduous a task to complete for
the composition of this article.
The contention that ‘during the seventeenth century English wages rose more rapidly than prices’ is
very misleading, in part because it is based on faulty data from Wiebe’s index.  The more serious fault is to
ignore the fact that the Price Revolution era in England had come to and end in the mid-seventeenth century,
to be followed by long-term, generally sustained deflation (except in the 1690s).  Surely the Hamilton thesis
must be evaluated in terms of the inflationary Price Revolution era alone.  The (refined) Phelps Brown and
Hopkins indices indicate the following for the period 1601- 05 to 1646-50, with a revised base of 1501-
10=100: a rise in the Composite Price Index (CPI) from  438.12 to 697.54 (a 59.21 percent rise); a rise in
Nominal Wage Index (NWI) from 200.00 (12d per day)  to 283.33 (17d per day, a 41.67 percent rise); and
thus a fall in Real Wage Index (RWI), from 45.65 to 40.69.  Thereafter, post Price-Revolution, prices did fall
(to an CPI of 584.76 in 1671-75), nominal wages continued to rise (to 18d or NWI of 300.00), and thus the
RWI rose to 51.30, by 1671-75 – but that is for an era also beyond the scope and temporal span of this
article.
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Felix’s most successful and certainly valid argument is that much of the inflation experienced in
Spain, France, and England during the Price Revolution era was in terms of ‘agricultural and wood product
prices’ and that when a comparison is made with industrial prices alone ‘industrial profit inflation shrinks to
quite modest proportions’.  Felix also repeats the Nef argument that price increases for many finished goods
evidently lagged behind the rise in the cost of their raw material components, especially timber and wool
fuels; and he thus endorses Nef’s that such changes in relative prices provided a key incentive for
technological changes leading to more capital-intensive forms of industrial production.
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A renewed debate about Profit Inflation in the light of current evidence: general considerations
We thus come to the core critique or essential component in evaluating the Hamilton thesis on ‘Profit
Inflation’. Certainly the quotation cited earlier from Hamilton’s seminal 1929 article (and essentially repeated
in all his subsequent publications) implies that industrial prices moved in tandem with the overall shifts in
the general price level (CPI). Unfortunately, in presenting his own data for Spain (and for the four regional
components:  Andalusia, Valencia, Castile, New Castile-Léon), Hamilton never provided any numerical
indices for the any of the commodity groupings in this composite price index.  He offered only some small-
scale graphs, which can be read only with great difficulty.  They suggest that agricultural prices and prices
for variety of commodities (a few industrial products) moved more or less in tandem with the price level. 
I have, however, calculated and added the mean grain prices for his four regions, and presented the results
that are produced in Tables 2 and 6, below.  They indicate that, from the 1560s, this index of grain prices
often, if not always, moved above the composite price index; and such a movement would imply, therefore,
that industrial prices from the 1560s did not generally rise as much as did the composite price index.
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The tables and graphs for prices in England and Brabant (Tables 3 - 6) provide the components of
the composite price index in three groups: farinaceous (grains, peas, and barely malt, for ‘drink); meat-fish-
dairy products; and industrial goods.  The weighting of the ‘baskets’ for these sub-components can be seen
in Table 7 below. What these tables 2-5 and graphs D and H clearly show, for the entire Price Revolution era,
is that the grain/farinaceous prices consistently, in these two regions, rose at a faster rate than other prices,
though usually followed by a somewhat lesser rise in the other food prices. Conversely, and quite expectedly,
for the reasons given above, the rise in industrial prices – and virtually all prices did rise in this era (including
the price of labour) – lagged well behind the rise in the prices of foodstuffs (and certain industrial raw
materials, as already noted, for England).
What therefore remains mystifying about Hamilton’s presentation of his Profit Inflation thesis – all
the more mystifying from a renowned scholar who was a professional economist – is why such ‘profit
inflation’ should be measured in terms of crude real wages, i.e., computed by dividing the Nominal (Money)
Wage Index by the Composite Price Index.  Thus, why and how would any industrialist in England (or
France) gain from a fall in the real wages of his employees, if the principal reason for that fall was the rise
in the costs of foodstuffs?  As Nef had suggested, such a fall in real wages may well have led to a reduction
in the demand of  industrial employees for manufactured goods.  
If that conjecture may well be perfectly correct, one should observe, however, that in Tudor-Stuart
England only a minority of the adult population lived by money-wages alone, and that a far higher proportion
of the population earned incomes from  agricultural, commercial,  and related economic activities, which
clearly benefited form a disproportionate rise in their prices and thus (or to some extent) their net incomes.
Thus a fall in demand for industrial products from money-wage earners may have been much more than
offset, during this era, by an increased in demand from landlords, tenant farmers, and even agricultural
employees (most of whom would have grown or raised their own food), as well as from traders and
merchants, petty capitalist producers, etc.  Nevertheless, while such an increased aggregate demand – if it did
occur – may have benefited industrial producers, these circumstances did not necessarily produce any ‘profit
inflation’.
Clearly the only correct method of measuring such ‘profit inflation’, and one that would permit better
conclusions on the thesis, would be to compare the actual money wages, and other costs, with the consumer
prices for each and every form of industrial production.  That is surely a commendable ideal, but a task that
is just impossible to fulfill.  
What may be done is much more modest, and perhaps ultimately still too modest: namely, to compare
the annual wages for building craftsmen (chiefly master masons and carpenters) with the annual  prices for
a small number of  industrial goods, those contained in the Phelps Brown & Hopkins and the Van der Wee
indices, and those in one other industrial-products index constructed by Robert Doughty – as shown in graphs
E and J (Tables 3 - 6).  Unfortunately wage-data for  most other industrial employees are lacking – certainly
lacking for any long-term comparisons to be made.  Furthermore, those employed in textiles and many other
industrial occupations wages were not paid by the day (from eight hours in winter months to fourteen in the
summer) – as they were for building craftsmen – but by piece-work, making such comparisons all the more
difficult.
How legitimate, therefore, is the use of wages for building craftsmen: both nominal and real? Any
long-term survey of the movement of their real wages does not lend support for the standard view in
economic theory that they reflect productivity changes. In the medieval era, such real wages reached their
peak in the 1460s (when the cost of living was unusually low), a level not again attained in England until the
early 1880s. It is difficult to believe that industrial productivity fell so much from the fifteenth century, even
with the population growth of the sixteenth century (from the 1520s), and did not regain that medieval peak18
49  On this question see also John Munro, ‘Builders’ Wages in Southern England and the Southern
Low Countries, 1346 -1500:  A Comparative Study of Trends in and Levels of Real Incomes’, in Simonetta
Cavaciocchi, ed., L’Edilizia prima della rivoluzione industriale, secc. XIII-XVIII, Atti delle “Settimana di
Studi” e altri convegni, no. 36, Istituto Internazionale di Storia Economica  “Francesco Datini” (Florence:
Le Monnier, 2005), pp. 1013-76.
50  Van der Wee, Growth of the Antwerp Market, vol. I: Statistics, section ii: Wages, pp. 333-34; 339-
41, 457-61, Appendix 48, pp. 541-42.  The wage rate chosen was the summer wage, which prevailed
throughout most of the year; and it is not clear that all masters were subjected to the lower winter wage in this
period (data on winter wages are in any event scarce). See John Munro, ‘Urban Wage Structures in Late-
Medieval England and the Low Countries: Work-Time and Seasonal Wages’ in Ian Blanchard, ed.,  Labour
and Leisure in Historical Perspective, Thirteenth to Twentieth Centuries, Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und
Wirtschaftsgeschichte Beiheft series 116 (Stuttgart 1994) 65-78;  Jan de Vries, ‘An Inquiry into the Behaviour
of Wages in the Dutch Republic and the Southern Netherlands, 1580-1800’, Acta Historia Neerlandica, 10
(1978) 79-97;  reprinted in Maurice Aymard, ed., Dutch Capitalism and World Capitalism (Cambridge, 1982)
37-62.
51  The harmonic mean  is ‘the reciprocal of the arithmetic mean of the reciprocals of the individual
numbers in a given series.’  See  F.C. Mills, Introduction to Statistics (New York, 1956) , pp. 108-12, 401.
even during periods of undisputed economic and industrial growth from the later seventeenth century (with
some depopulation) and through the Industrial Revolution era.. Yet it must also be noted that the relationship
between productivity and wages is oversimplified, for the true formula in economic theory for the real wage
is: WL = MRPL; and thus the marginal revenue product could fall with a decline in the real price of the
product that the unit of labour produces, even if its productivity did not fall (or even rose).
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The one justification for using the money wages of building craftsmen (masons and carpenters) as
a proxy for industrial wages is the opportunity-cost argument.  Thus those who employed such craftsmen –
and most worked for a wide variety of employers – had to pay a wage that would keep these artisans in that
occupation and in their employ; and thus presumably they would have had to match wages that were being
paid in comparable industrial occupations.
In the following comparisons, involving Spain, southern England, and Brabant, from 1501 to 1650,
i.e.., to the end of the Price Revolution era,  the real wages have been computed by two methods. The first
is, of course, the standard method: by dividing the annual nominal or money wage index (NWI) by the
Composite Price Index (CPI), or ‘basket of consumables’ index, for each year.  The second was used only
for Brabant, for which, as noted earlier, the annual prices for all commodities within the ‘basket’ are
available. The average number of days that master building craftsmen worked each year has been estimated,
on the basis of data supplied by Van der Wee, at 210 days; and that number was multiplied by the average
annual money wage (the mean annual wage of master masons and carpenters) to obtain an estimate of the
annual money wage income.
50 That  amount was divided by the annual value of the Van der Wee ‘basket of
consumables’ to produce, therefore, an estimate of real wage incomes in terms of the number of baskets so
purchased.  
Much (but not all) the data in the graphs are presented in both arithmetic and semi-logarithmic scales;
and for most purposes of international comparisons, the latter is the better in revealing comparative rates of
changes.  In the tables, in which all the data are presented in quinquennial means, those for real wages have
been computed in terms of the harmonic and not arithmetic mean, which is the better method for computing
average quantities of goods purchased with a given sum of money.
51  Proof of the pudding may be seen in19
 The mathematical expression for this harmonic mean is: HM = 1/ [ 3 (1/r1 + 1/r2 + 1/r3 + ... 1/rn) ] / N
That can be rewritten in a two-part equation, for each quinquennium (five-year period): HM = 1/x, when
x = 3 (1/r1 + 1/r2 + 1/r3 +  1/r4 + 1/r5) / 5. 
52  The annual index numbers used for the CPI are those from my modified or corrected version of
the Phelps Brown and Hopkins index; and in this study, for reasons indicated earlier, the quinquennial means
are harmonic rather than arithmetic. See above, p.  000 and the sources for Table 8 below.
53  See Hamilton, ‘The Decline of Spain’, pp. 215-26 (n.  2 above); and Earl Hamilton, War and
Prices in Spain, 1651-1800 (Cambridge, Mass., 1947); for other views, see Maurice Schwarzmann,
'Background Factors in the Spanish Economic Decline’, Explorations in Entrepreneurial History, 3:4 (April
1951), 221-47; J.H. Elliott, ‘The Decline of Spain’, Past and Present, No. 20 (Nov. 1961), pp. 52 - 75;
revised edn. published in Trevor Aston, ed., Crisis in Europe, 1560 - 1660: Essays from Past and Present
(London, 1965), pp. 167 - 93; and in Carlo Cipolla, ed., The Economic Decline of Empires (London, 1970),
pp. 168-97; R. Trevor Davies, The Golden Century of Spain, 1501-1621 (London, 1961), pp. 227-94;  R.
Trevor Davies, Spain in Decline, 1621-1700 (London, 1965); Henry Kamen, ‘The Decline of Castile: The
Last Crisis’, Economic History Review, 2nd ser. 17 (1964), 63-76;  J.H. Elliott, Imperial Spain, 1469-1716
(London, 1964), pp. 242-382;  Jaime Vicens Vives, ‘The Decline of Spain in the Seventeenth Century’, in
his Economic History of Spain, translated by Frances Lopez-Morillas (Princeton, 1969), Chapters 29-30;
republished in Cipolla, Economic Decline of Empires, pp. 121-67.
the fact that the computations of the harmonic means of the real wages for building craftsmen in Brabant
produce identical results by both of these techniques (Table 3). This experiment therefore validates the Phelps
Brown and Hopkins’ computation of real-wages indices, in using the same formula, for each year in their
series: RW = NWI/CPI. 
52  But for the reasons just indicated, the most apt comparison is the changing
relationship between nominal (money) wages and current industrial prices, which has been computed by
dividing the NWI by the Industrial Price Index (IPI) alone. Again, a second computation was made for
Brabant: by dividing the annual value of all the industrial products in the Van der Wee ‘basket of
consumables’ by the estimated annual wage income of master building craftsmen (as explained above).
Since Hamilton never did provide a composite index of industrial prices, such a comparison is not
possible for early-modern Spain (or for any of its four regions).  Nevertheless, as Table 2 and graph B, and
indeed as Hamilton himself noted, money wages did not lag to any significant extent behind the composite
price index during the 150 year period from 1501 to 1650; and, with the base 1501-10=100, the real wage
index (harmonic means) fell below 90 in only four quinquennia: in 1546-50 (88.08), 1571-75 (89.32), 1596-
1600 (86.84), and 1646-50 (89.79). Indeed, from 1606 to 1620, real wages actually experienced a significant
rise (peaking at 115.66 in 1611-15).  If wages did keep such a pace with a composite price index heavily
weighted by foodstuffs – whose prices often did rise above the CPI (Table 1) – then it seems unlikely, for
reasons elaborated above (p.  000), that they ever fell behind the presumed rise in industrial prices. For
Hamilton, the absence of any such lag in wages, and thus the lack of any detectable ‘profit inflation’, was a
prime explanation for Spain’s failure to achieve any significant industrial growth in the early modern era and
thus also an important if not the only reason for Spain’s ‘economic decline’.
53  But this debate also does not
have any relevance for this current study.
A search for Profit Inflation in England during the Price Revolution era
For England, however, graphs C and E, and Table 3 together reveal an entirely and strikingly
different picture.  Thus, despite Nef’s criticisms of the older set of real wages indices (Thorold Rogers-
Wiebe), the subsequent  set of more highly refined indices produced by Phelps Brown and Hopkins (further20
54  E.Anthony  Wrigley and R.S. Schofield, The Population History of England, 1541 - 1871: A
Reconstruction (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1980), pp. 528 - 29, for the years 1541 - 1871. The
figures they present are for England alone, less the country of Monmouthshire. To present the figures in the
usual form, for England and Wales together, I have divided their annual data by 0.93383 (as indicated on p.
557, note to Table A5.3). For late-medieval England, see the debated discussed in Pamela Nightingale, ‘The
Growth of London in the Medieval English Economy’, in Richard Britnell and John Hatcher, eds., Progress
and Problems in Medieval England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 89-106.
55  See above p. 000  and n.  25; and below Tables  7 - 8.
56  See Phelps Brown and Hopkins, ‘Building Wages’, in n.  25 above.
57  See the previous note.
refined, as noted earlier) still show a very stark fall in real wages. Again, with an adjusted base of 1501-10
= 100, the real wage index (NWI/CPI, in quinquennial harmonic means) had fallen to 52.92 as early as 1556-
60 and to a nadir of 39.16 in 1631-35; and it was only 49.33 in 1656-60, when the forces of the Price
Revolution were beginning to be reversed..  The most significant drop was in the early to mid sixteenth
century; and since England and Wales were, by any measure, quite underpopulated in the 1520s, with less
than 2.5 million inhabitants (vs. 4.5 to 6.5 million ca. 1300), and had no more than 3.2 million in 1561  –
perhaps about half of the medieval peak, it seems unlikely that population growth was the sole culprit
responsible for this stark decline in real wages.
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However, the more relevant index is that for the ratio of English money wages (per day) to the sub-
index for a weighted basket of industrial product prices extracted from the Phelps Brown and Hopkins ‘basket
of consumables’: NWI/IPI.
55  Those index numbers (again in terms of quinquennial harmonic means) fall to
only 86.92 in 1556-60, declining slowly if irregularly thereafter, reaching a nadir of 68.55 in 1616-20, and
climbed to a peak (for this period) of 89.12 in 1651-55, then declining to 80.84 in 1666-70. But, as noted
earlier, England experienced deflation (in terms of the CPI) from the 1650s, while money wages continued
to rise, albeit slowly (for a master mason:  from 17d per day in 1646-50 to 18d per day by 1656-60).
56 
The somewhat more varied index of industrial prices compiled by Robert Doughty (see p.  000, with
15 industrial products)  has also been used in this study, even though it terminates in 1640;
57 and its index
numbers also are presented in Table 3.   It reveals a somewhat greater potential for industrial ‘profit inflation’,
since the index numbers for the ratio of NWI/IPI (with the same 1501-10 base) fell to 76.58 in 1556-60 and
then, despite a slight jump in 1581-85 (to 82.08) they fell to a much more significant nadir of 61.81 in 1626-
30, and then rose to 70.96 in the final quinquennium of 1636-40, even before deflation had begun to set in.
If this table seems to offer somewhat more evidence of at least potential industrial ‘profit inflation’ in early
modern England than either Nef or Felix had been willing to concede, the relevant evidence – with these
comparisons involving industrial prices – is nevertheless far too weak to support Hamilton’s overly and quite
unrealistically optimistic case for establishing why England became the homeland of modern capitalistic
industrialization.  As noted earlier, however, we simply lack sufficient evidence, for all three regions, to
conduct the optimum test: i.e., to compare the actual money wages and wholesale product prices in every
major industry, along with changes in other costs.
A search for ‘profit inflation’ in Brabant (southern Low Countries) during the Price Revolution
An even more strikingly different picture, and different for generally opposite reasons, is to be found
across the channel, in early-modern Brabant, or more precisely in the Antwerp-Lier-Brussels region. Rather21
58 See Van der Wee, ‘Prices and Wages’, p.  240; and n.  28 above.
59  Keynes, Treatise on Money, Vol. II, p. 161.
60  See Van der Wee, Growth of the Antwerp Market, vol. II, pp. 41-280, 369-88; Herman Van der
Wee, ‘The Economy as a Factor in the Revolt of the Southern Low Countries’, Acta Historia Neerlandica,
5 (1971), pp. 52-67, reprinted in his collection The Low Countries in the Early Modern World (Cambridge,
1993), pp. 264-78.  See also Herman Van der Wee,  ‘Structural Changes and Specialization in Southern
Netherlands Industry, 1100 - 1600’,  Economic History Review, 2
nd ser., 28:2 (May 1975), 203-21;
republished in the same volume,  pp. 201-22; and  also: Hermann Van der Wee, ‘Industrial Dynamics and
the Process of Urbanization and De-Urbanization in the Low Countries from the Late Middle Ages to the
Eighteenth Century: A Synthesis’, in Herman Van der Wee, ed., The Rise and Decline of Urban Industries
surprisingly, the behaviour of real wages there is much more in accordance with the Spanish experience than
with the English. For the real-wage index, whether measured by the ratio of money wages indices to those
for the ‘basket of consumables’ (i.e., NWI/CPI), or by the ratio of money wages to the value of that basket
(in d. groot Brabant), again with harmonic means for the five-year averages, shows very little decline for most
of the Price Revolution era (see graphs F - I; Tables 4-6).  The real-wage index (1501-10=100) falls below
90 only in five quinquennia before the war-torn years of the 1580s (falling from 106.53 in 1576-80 to 72.34
in 1586-90); and indeed in five quinquennia, that index rises above 100.  That low-point of 1586-90 is
surpassed only once, in 1646-50 (RWI of 69.55).  And if the second quarter of the seventeenth century seems
to be relatively bleak, when the real-wage index falls below 80, the first quarter of the seventeenth century
was one of strongly rising real wages, when the mean real wage index was consistently above 110, until 1620.
One explanation for that rise, and then the subsequent fall was that this period (1601-20) marked  during the
relatively peaceful interim between the Truce of 1609-21 and this region’s involvement in the Thirty Years’
War (1618-48).
58
Far more revealing are the index numbers for the quinquennial mean ratios between the nominal
money wage index and the index of the composite of industrial prices (NWI/IPI).  For there is no indication
whatsoever of any industrial ‘profit inflation’; and that ratio rises to 140.53 in 1536-40, falling somewhat
thereafter, but with one sharp upsurge in 1561-65, reaching 185.56, then falling to 117.68 (in 1571-75) – but
still well above that crucial 100 mark indicator – and then rising to 167.95 in 1611-15. During the first half
of the seventeenth century this ratio of money wages to industrial prices consistently remained well above
that mark, and generally above 130, except in the decade 1641-50, when it fell to about 124. That decade also
marked the end of the Price Revolution era in the Low Countries, as well; and thereafter, while prices fell,
wages did not (stable at 72d. groot per day for both masons and carpenters from 1600).  Another way to look
at this ratio is to compute the value of annual money wages as a proportion of the composite of industrial
prices in the Van der Wee basket. It rose from 15.68 percent in 1511-15 (i.e., before the actual onset of the
Price Revolution in the Low Countries)  to a peak of 30.56 percent in 1561-65, but thereafter it was virtually
always above 20 percent, and frequently above 25 percent (Table 5).
This is a situation that, for both Hamilton and Keynes, was the exact and negative opposite of Profit
Inflation.    For, indeed, Keynes called his readers’ attention to ‘the extra-ordinary correspondence between
the periods of Profit Inflation and of Profit Deflation respectively with those of national rise and decline.’
59
Surely, at least for that latter case, this represents a gross historical inaccuracy for the early-modern Low
Countries.  Most historians would agree that, during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, this region
(including Holland) was economically much more advanced than England, let alone Spain: with  far more
extensive and richer industrial, commercial, and financial sectors, which together promoted a far more
extensive degree of urbanization in the Low Countries.
60 Certainly for most of the sixteenth century, at least22
in Italy and in the Low Countries: Late Middle Ages - Early Modern Time (Leuven, 1988), pp. 307-81;
Herman Van der Wee and Jan Materné, ‘Antwerp as a World Market in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth
Centuries’, in J. Van der Stock, ed., Antwerp: Story of a Metropolis, 16th - 17th Century, Antwerp 93,
Hessenhuis 25 June - 10 October 1993 (Ghent, 1993), 19-31; Jan de Vries and Ad van der Woude, Nederland
1500 - 1815: De eerste ronde van moderne economische groei (Amsterdam: Balans, 1995); republished in
English translation as  The First Modern Economy: Success, Failure, and Perseverance of the Dutch
Economy, 1500 - 1815 (Cambridge and New York, 1997).
61  Van der Wee, ‘Prices and Wages’, p. 240.
62  See Émile Coornaert,  La draperie-sayetterie d'Hondschoote, XIVe-XVIIIe siècles (Paris, 1930);
Émile Coornaert, ‘Draperies rurales, draperies urbaines: l'evolution de l'industrie flamande au moyenâge et
au XVI siècle’, Belgische tijdschrift voor filologie en gescheidenis/Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire,
28 (1950), 60-96; Jan Craeybeckx, ‘L'industrie de la laine dans les anciens Pays-Bas méridionaux de la fin
du XVIe au début du XVIIIe siècle’, in Marco Spallanzani, ed.,  Produzione, commercio e consumo dei panni
di lana (Florence, 1976), pp. 21-43; John H. Munro,  ‘The Origins of the English ‘New Draperies’: The
Resurrection of an Old Flemish Industry, 1270 - 1570’, in Negley Harte, ed., The New Draperies in the Low
Countries and England, 1300 - 1800,  Pasold Studies in Textile History no. 10 (Oxford and New York, 1997),
pp.  35-127.
63  See Tables 4-5 below; and Van der Wee, ‘Prices and Wages’, p. 240 (n.  28 above).  Perhaps Van
der Wee means that the subsequent fall in real wages, from 1621-25 to 1646-50 inclusive, was a time-lagged
effect of prior population increase; but this longer period of falling real wages also encompassed a period of
prolonged demographic decline, for a which a time-lagged effect is more difficult to explain.  Van der Wee
also maintains (p. 240) that the earlier war-induced demographic decline had led to ‘a rise in the real per
until the 1570s, Brabant itself probably experienced more substantial industrial growth, especially in textiles
and various luxury oriented crafts, than did England (despite the overwhelming success of its broadcloth
industry).  Antwerp’s ‘Golden Age’ was, after all, the century from the 1460s to the 1560s, i.e., to outbreak
of the Revolt of the Netherlands in 1566-68.   One of its most important industries was in finishing textiles,
especially English woollens.  Subsequently, however, Van der Wee does concede that ‘the Eighty Years’ War
was clearly an important factor in the structural decline of the economy of Brabant [and the southern
Netherlands more generally].’
61 
Nevertheless, we should not paint too bleak a picture of the economy of the southern Low Countries
during the seventeenth century, even if it clearly fell behind the north (i.e., the ‘United Provinces’ or Dutch
Republic).  It  did  achieve some significant recovery in the first third, even during the Thirty Years War
(1618-48) , as can be seen, for example, in industrial statistics for the Flemish  Hondschoote sayetterie, which,
before the Revolt, had been northern Europe’s leading producer of the light worsted-type say fabrics.   Its
sales , having reached a peak of 93,057 says in 1566-70 (mean), with the outbreak of the Revolt, then fell
sharply to a mean of just 12,128 says in 1586-90; but it then recovered to 54,767 says in 1626-30, its
seventeenth century peak. By that time its English rival, the so-called New Draperies, largely created (or re-
created) by Flemish refugee artisans in East Anglia, from the 1570s, had successfully displaced the Flemish
(and the Dutch, to the north), as the north European leader in producing these cheap, light fabrics.
62  As Van
der Wee has so rightly noted, the ‘economic decay of Brabant’ from the second quarter of the seventeenth
century has to be explained by a complex set of other factors, including changes in international trade.  Yet
it is far from clear that demographic variables – population growth during the 1609-21 Truce, followed by
decline –  and changing real wages have that much explanatory power, especially since real wages rose the
most strongly during that Truce, and then fell with the ensuring demographic and economic decline.
63 23
capita wage income from 1587 onwards’; but that seems to be contradicted by Table 4:  real wages fell from
100.88 in 1581-85 to 72.34 in 1586-90 recovering only to 87.43 in 1596-1600, but to 115.31 in 1601-05. 
64  See n.  17  above; and John Munro, ‘The Usury Doctrine and Urban Public Finances in Late-
Medieval Flanders (1220 - 1550): Rentes (Annuities), Excise Taxes, and Income Transfers from the Poor to
the Rich’, in Simonetta Cavaciocchi, ed., La fiscalità nell’economia Europea, secc.  XIII - XVIII/ Fiscal
Systems in the European Economy from the 13
th to the 18
th Centuries, Atti della ‘Trentanovesima Settimana
di Studi’, Fondazione Istituto Internazionale di Storia Economica “F.  Datini”, Prato, Serie II: Atti delle
“Settimane de Studi” et altri Convegni 39 (Florence: Firenze University Press, 2008),  pp.  973-1026.
65  Van der Wee, ‘Prices and Wages’, p. 240; and Van der Wee, Growth of the Antwerp Market, vol.
II, pp. 381-88, 419-22.
66  Van der Wee, ‘Wages and Prices’, pp. 232, 238; see also n.  60 above.
In any event, the two more general and related conclusions must stand.  First and foremost,
throughout this period Brabant almost consistently experienced, in Keynes’ terminology, ‘Profit Deflation’,
at least in terms of the ratio of nominal wages to industrial prices, without any apparent  negative
consequences for industrial growth, certainly not during the two-thirds of the sixteenth century preceding the
Revolt and during the first two decades of the seventeenth (i.e., during the 1609-21 Truce).  Second, building
craftsmen, and presumably many other industrial workers, in sixteenth-century Brabant, and also for much
of the seventeenth century, were far more successful in maintaining or even in improving their  real wages
than were their English counterparts.
Since inflation was often more severe in Brabant than in England, especially also with a more
pronounced rise in the price of foodstuffs (see graph H), the explanation must lie in the ability of urban
building craftsmen Brabant in to secure better compensation in terms of  rising money wages.
64  Quite
possibly, as Van der Wee suggests,  their success lay in superior corporate organization and more effective
guild powers.
65  Clearly there was far less nominal ‘wage stickiness’ than in England during the sixteenth
century, though certainly just as much in the seventeenth century (during both the inflationary and
deflationary periods), as may be seen in Tables 2-4.
At the same time, it is so tempting to believe, as Van der Wee suggests, that the superior performance
of the more highly advanced Brabantine economy, compared to England’s still basically agrarian economy,
would explain the striking disparities in real-wage trends between these two regions, at least  until the later
seventeenth century. But one set of statistics does not really support that assumption: for in 1401-05, the
annual money income of a master carpenter and mason (mean wage) could have purchased 10.821 of the Van
der Wee commodity baskets, an amount finally exceeded in the 1460s, but not again matched, until the mid-
sixteenth century.  At the beginning of the fifteenth century, it must be noted, Antwerp was in fact
experiencing population growth;
66 but it was still an economic ‘backwater’, subservient to Flanders, and many
decades away from commencing its role as an international entrepôt and financial centre.  Thus in 1531-35,
when Antwerp’s economy had clearly become far more highly advanced, a builders’ annual money wage
income could purchase only 7.811 consumer baskets (though 10.104 baskets in 1546-50); and only in 1561-
65 – and in the only quinquennium of the sixteenth century  –  was that amount exceeded, with 12.279 baskets
(falling to 6.662 baskets in 1586-90). Economic recovery in the Truce years of 1609-21 did mean a recovery
in purchasing power to just over 10 such consumer baskets a year, i.e., again about the level of the early
fifteenth century.
Thus such studies in the behaviour of real wages, let alone a search for potential ‘Profit Inflation’,24
67  Van der Wee, ‘Wages and Prices’, p. 240, seems to be somewhat sympathetic to the concept of
Profit Inflation in stating that ‘falling real wage rates in the 16
th century had long helped the export of
traditional textiles’; and, on p. 241, that the ‘very low 16
th-century wage level opened wide prospects of extra
profits for those entrepreneurs who succeeded in developing and launching new products’. But, as indicated
earlier, we simply lack the specific price and wage data to substantiate these views.
68  Gould, ‘The Price Revolution Reconsidered’, p. 95 (see n.  16 above). See also his useful
comments about the ‘profit inflation’ debate (chiefly based on Nef and Felix).
69  Van der Wee, Growth of the Antwerp Market, vol. I: Statistics, Appendix 45/1 - 2, pp. 525-27. No
usable data are available after 1555 because the government was obtaining short-term funds from other
sources; and the Spanish bankruptcy of 1557 disturbed relations with traditional lenders.  For other evidence
on falling interest rates in the Price Revolution era, see Sidney Homer and Richard Sylla, A History of Interest
Rates, 3
rd rev. edn (New Brunswick, 1991), especially Table 11 (pp. 137-38), and Chart 2 (p. 140); and Ian
Blanchard, ‘International Capital Markets and Their Users, 1450 - 1750’, in Maarten Prak, ed., Early Modern
Capitalism: Economic and Social Change in Europe, 1400 - 1800, Routledge Explorations in Economic
History no. 21 (London and New York, 2001), pp. 107-24, esp. figure 6.1, ‘Northern European Base Interest
Rates, 1265-1635’ (p. 108), and fig. 6.4 (p. 116).
tell us very little, if anything at all, about the sources of industrial and economic growth.
67  Indeed the
penultimate conclusion about the Hamilton thesis, and more generally about any concepts of Profit Inflation
as a factor promoting industrial growth in early-modern Europe, is that they make little sense, and for many
reasons beyond those proposed by Nef and Felix.
Inflation and other factor costs: capital and the real rate of interest
Indeed, such theses do not explain why capitalist industrialists in early-modern western Europe, if
they actually did secure more and more profits from any widening gap between prices and industrial wages,
would have been inspired to invest them in more capital-intensive, large scale enterprises. For if, as so many
historians still assume, population growth was chiefly responsible for the fall in real wages during this Price
Revolution era, why would rational industrial capitalists have replaced an ever increasing and cheapening
factor of production, namely labour, with the  presumably more expensive factor, capital?   Thus, even if
population growth may have induced diminishing returns in arable agriculture, with a falling marginal
productivity of labour, we may well doubt that population growth had the same consequences, for industrial
crafts, apart from reducing real wages. Thus, we may presume that most industrialists would have sought to
expand production by hiring more and more cheap labour, with evidently very elastic supplies, rather than
by increasing capital investments  – ceteris paribus.  In this respect, the Nef thesis, as posed, does make much
more sense than the Hamilton thesis.
Nevertheless, there was another macro-economic factor that probably did encourage relatively greater
capital investments.  As J. D. Gould suggested so long ago, long-term inflation, especially that experienced
in the Price Revolution, often did cheapen the costs of capital investments.
68  For, nominal interest rates rarely
adjusted for inflation in this era; and if they did not do so, then real interests fell, which they most certainly
did.  Furthermore, Van der Wee’s data for the Low Countries indicate that even nominal rates of interest, for
short term public loans, were falling during the sixteenth century: in Flanders, from 20.5 percent in 1511-15
to 11.0 percent in 1566-70; and on the Antwerp market, again from 20 percent in 1511 to 10 percent in 1550
(but 14 percent in 1555).
69  Consider, therefore, the prospects for real  gains then being offered to many
industrialists,  those in the more capital intensive industries, in particular.  Typically, in borrowing capital,
the loan contracts stipulated annual interest payments and repayment of the principal, on the loan’s maturity,25
70  See nn.  33-39, above, and Tables 1 and  8 below.
71  See, also in n.  1, 10 above;  in particular, Munro, ‘Origins of the Price Revolution’, pp.  1-14
(especially Table 1.3, pp.  8-9);  Munro, ‘The Central European Silver Mining Boom’, pp.  119-83;  and also
John Nef, ‘Silver Production in Central Europe, 1450-1618’, Journal of Political Economy, 49 (1941),
575-91; John Nef, ‘Mining and Metallurgy’, in M.M. Postan and E. E. Miller, eds., Cambridge Economic
History, Vol. II: Trade and Industry in the Middle Ages, revised edn. (Cambridge, 1987), pp. 691-761,
especially pp. 721-46.
72  The smelted iron, if to be used, as a consumer product was poured molten into a cast or mould:
hence its name ‘cast iron’.  The term ‘pig iron’ was applied to exactly the same product when  the smelted
iron was then taken to a forge for refining into purified wrought or malleable iron.  The hydraulic machinery
was used to power the bellows to create the proper blast for the furnace.  Various forms of hydraulic
machinery were used in many other new or relatively new industries of this era: including the tilt hammers
in refinery forges.   See John Munro, ‘Industrial Energy from Water-Mills in the European Economy, 5
th to
18
th Centuries: the Limitations of Power’, in Simonetta Cavaciocchi, ed., Economia ed energia, seccoli XIII -
XVIII,  Atti delle ‘Settimane di Studi’ e altrie Convegni, Istituto Internazionale di Storia Economica,
‘Francesco Datini da Prato’, vol. 34 (Florence, Le Monnier:  2003), pp. 223-69;  and also Terry S. Reynolds,
Stronger than a Hundred Men: A History of the Vertical Water Wheel (Baltimore and London, 1983).
in terms of nominal money-of-account: e.g., in pounds sterling, livres tournois, ponden groot.  The real values
of those capital payments would have fallen, year by year, while the value of their outputs rose.
Capital Intensive Industries in the Price Revolution Era
One may well ask, however, what important large-scale capital intensive industries may be found in
the Price Revolution era?  That question becomes all the more important if our revision of the Nef thesis, and
the careful examination of his historical evidence for the ‘new’ larger-scale industries, especially the
necessarily large-scale coal-burning industries using the capital costly reverberatory furnace technology, are
chiefly to be found from and after the 1640s, when the Price Revolution had come to an end.
70
Nevertheless, there were indeed many and much more important examples of large-scale capital-
intensive industries to be found in this era.  Even if some of them owed their origins, with much different
economic circumstances, to the deflationary fifteenth century, they did experience very considerable
expansion and growth in the Price Revolution era.  The first to be cited was  a veritable revolution in mining
and smelting. The industrial revolution in mining involved capital-costly innovations in mechanical
engineering: to cope with the inevitable problem of flooding with much deeper mine shafts, and thus to reach
and safely exploit vast deposits of hitherto  untouched silver-copper ores.  That resolution of that crucial
problem was the invention and  application of an advanced form of hydraulic machinery to create vacuum-
powered drainage machinery.  The closely related other industrial revolution, in smelting copper and silver
ores, was developed in chemical engineering: the Seigerhütten process, using lead, in smelting the cupric-
argentiferous ores, in order  to separate these two previously inseparable metals.
71  As noted earlier, those two
innovations in mining and metallurgy were responsible for the South-German Central European mining
boom, from the 1460s to the 1530s, which in turn provided the initial monetary foundations for the European
Price Revolution.
The Seigerhütten  process also used hydraulic machinery, in this case, to power the smelter’s bellows,
as did  another new, indeed revolutionary form of metallurgy: the vast brick-kiln  blast furnace, to smelt and
produce either cast and pig iron.
72  Though its origins may lie in the late-fourteenth-century Rhineland, and26
73   Data from George  Hammersley, ‘The Charcoal Iron Industry and its Fuel, 1540-1750’, Economic
History Review, 2nd ser. 26:4 (1973), 593-613 (esp.  table on p.  595);  Charles Hyde, Technological Change
and the British Iron Industry, 1700-1870 (Princeton, 1977);  Philip Riden, ‘The Output of the British Iron
Industry before 1870’,  Economic History Review, 2nd ser., 30:3 (Aug. 1977), 442-59.
74  Thomas, ‘Was There an Energy Crisis in Great Britain’, pp. 124 - 52 (see n.  42 above).  See also
the sources cited in the previous and following notes, which indicate that, in 1720, charcoal accounted for
71.0% of the costs of smelting a ton of pig iron, compared to 15.2% for the iron ore, and only 3.0% for the
furnace labour. 
75  See the sources cited in n.  73-74  above; and also in Thomas S. Ashton, Iron and Steel in the
Industrial Revolution (Manchester: University Press, 1924;  reprinted 1951), pp. 1-23;   H.  R. Schubert,   The
History of the British Iron and Steel Industry from ca. 450 B.C. to A.D. 1775  (London, 1957); Michael Flinn,
The History of the British Coal Industry, Vol II: 1700 - 1830: The Industrial Revolution (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1984), esp.  pp.  23-35, 286-328;  Charles K. Hyde, ‘The Adoption of Coke-Smelting by the British
Iron Industry, 1709-1790’,   Explorations in Economic History,  10:4 (1973),  397-418;   J.  R.. Harris, The
British Iron Industry, Studies in Economic and Social History series (London: Macmillan, 1988).
became prominent in the fifteenth-century eastern Low Countries, the blast smelter was introduced into
England only in the very late fifteenth century.  Subsequently, during the sixteenth and early seventeenth-
centuries, it enjoyed a remarkable expansion:  the output of pig rose from about 1,200 tons in the 1530s (with
6 blast furnaces) to a peak of about 23,000 tons in the 1650s (with 86 blast furnaces), a 19.26 fold expansion.
73
For its fuel, the blast furnace was necessarily confined to using wood-charcoal, because iron production or
‘winning’ requires the direct contact of the carbon in charcoal (pure) with the oxygen in the iron ore — ferric
oxide: Fe2O3 – in order to liberate the iron from the oxygen, and thus, as the liberated oxygen combines with
the carbon in the fuel,   to produce the residual gas carbon dioxide (CO2).  
By the 1650s, high fuel costs (along with limitations on free water sites), as demonstrated in Table 8,
was making the English iron industry uncompetitive with imports from heavily forested Sweden and Russia
(with higher quality ores):  so much so that iron imports had expanded from just 1,700 tons in the 1580s to
23,000 tons in the 1680s, then accounting for over half of England’s iron consumption.
74   Coal had far too
many contaminants to permit its use in iron smelting.  That fuel problem  was not resolved until the
development of ultimately lower-cost coke – ie.,  purified coal, with virtually pure carbon.  That began, ca.
1710, with Abraham Darby’s first successful coke-fired blast furnace; but it was really not fully cost-effective
until the application of James Watt’s new coal-fired steam engine, in 1776, to the air-pistons producing the
blast, thereby cutting the fuel costs by one-third.
75
The other major form of large-scale capital-intensive industry of even greater economic importance
in this era was ship-building: especially in the evolution of the so-called Atlantic Ship, from the Portuguese
caravels of the mid-fifteenth to the carracks and galleons of the early sixteenth centuries.  Their size and scale
further increased from about 600 tonnes in the early sixteenth  century to 1500 tonnes by the 1590s.   That
increased scale was in part the consequence of military technology:  the addition of naval artillery, with  up
to 50 or 60 cannons, placed  both on deck and below deck.  These heavily armed, powerfully rigged ships
allowed Europeans to dominate the world’s oceanic trade routes from the sixteenth to the late nineteenth
century; and for England itself, her larger, sturdily oak-built, and heavily-gunned galleons (of the Levant
Company, discussed below) allowed her merchants to dominate Mediterranean trade by the later seventeenth27
76 See in particular Richard Unger, The Ship in the Medieval Economy, 600-1600 (London and
Montreal, 1980); and Richard Unger, Dutch Shipbuilding before 1800 : Ships and Guilds (Assen, 1978).  For
England, see: Ralph Davis, ‘England and the Mediterranean, 1570-1670,’ in F.  J.  Fisher, ed.,   Essays in the
Economic and Social History of Tudor and Stuart England: In Honour of R.  H.  Tawney,(Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1961) ,  pp. 117-26; Ralph Davis, English Overseas Trade, 1500 - 1700.  Studies
in Economic History ( London: Macmillan, 1973), pp.  20-31; Ralph Davis, The Rise of the English Shipping
Industry in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (London, 1962), pp.  1-57, 228-56;  Giglioa Pagano
de Divitiis, Mercanti inglesi nell’Italia del Seicento: Navi, traffici, egemonie (Venice: Marsilio Editore),
1990; republished as English Merchants in Seventeenth-Century Italy, trans.  by Stephen Parkin, Cambridge
Studies in Italian History and Culture (Cambridge: University Press, 1997), pp.  41-55, especially Table 2.1,
p.  43.
77 The first known or first documented joint-stock company was England’s Muscovy or Russia
Company, created in 1553.  The classic study is and remains: William  Robert Scott,  The Constitution and
Finance of English, Scottish and Irish  Joint-Stock Companies to 1720, 3 vols.  (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1912; reissued: Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1968.), vol.  I, pp.  18-21; vol.  II, pp.  36-
69. See also Thomas  S.  Willan,  The Early History of the Russia Company, 1553 - 1603 (Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 1956; repr. 1968); T.S. Willan, The Muscovy Merchants of 1555 ( New York:
A.  M.  Kelly, 1973) ; T.  S. Willan, Studies in Elizabethan Foreign Trade ( New York: A.  M.  Kelly, 1968).
England’s other prominent overseas joint-stock trading companies of this era were: (1) The Levant Company:
originally created in 1581 as the Turkey Company, and then re-organized in 1591, as the far better known
Levant Company;  and (2) The East India Company: created  in 1600, with a royal charter and a monopoly
on trade with South Asia (i.e., with those parts of Asia not included in the Russia Company’s monopoly
charter).
78  For example the Muscovy Company was originally established with £6,000 sterling raised by the
sales of shares to 240 investors, another £4,000 was raised through loans.  See the previous note.
79 Eric Kerridge, ‘The Movement of Rent, 1540 - 1640’,  Economic History Review, 2
nd ser., 6:1
(1953), 16-34; reprinted in Eleanora Carus-Wilson, Essays in Economic History, Vol. II  (London:
Macmillan, 1962), pp. 208-26.
trade 
76.  
That leads us to another crucial factor in increased scales in ships and the shipbuilding industry itself,
from the 1550s:  the creation of chartered joint-stock overseas trading companies to engage in long-distance,
truly global trade with the Mediterranean, all parts of Asia, Africa, and the Americas: first by the English, then
by the Dutch, French, and other Europeans.
77 Although the principal form of financing these new, highly
capital intensive overseas trading companies was the revolutionary innovation of joint-stock, or sales of shares
of ownership to hundreds of investors, they also depended heavily on loans and other forms of borrowed
capital.
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Inflation and Other Factor Costs: Land and real rents
Price or cost changes in the one remaining factor of production, land and thus landed rents, might also
offer another form of ‘profit inflation’ (as Hamilton himself had suggested). For most historians, however, any
confidence in that hypothesis was virtually destroyed in 1953 by Eric Kerridge’s classic article on ‘The
Movement of Rent’ in Tudor Stuart England.
79  For his data showed that private agricultural rents had28
80  See the sources given for Table 7.  See also Thorold Rogers, History of Agriculture and Prices,
vol.  IV: 1401-1582, 383-7; and vol. V: 1583-1702, 398-402.
81  From just the Herbert and Seymour estates.  Subsequently, in Eric Kerridge, Agrarian Problems
in the Sixteenth Century and After, Historical Problems: Studies and Documents no. 6 (London, 1969), pp.
17-31, 94-136, in opposing Tawney’s views on landlords’s arbitrary enclosures, he noted the regional
variations in the ability of landlords’ to engage in such tactics, suggesting that many rents did not rise. Across
the Channel, Van der Wee’s data on polder rents in the Antwerp vicinity indicate a 9.89 fold rise from 1510
to 1630. Nevertheless, throughout this period, for periods generally from five to ten years, those rents
remained fixed (evidently by contract or lease). Van der Wee, Growth of the Antwerp Market, Vol. I,
Appendix 40/1, pp. 477-82.
variously risen eight- to ten-fold from 1510-19 to 1650-59 (or from 4.38 to 7.03 fold from 1530-39), and thus
in close correspondence with the overall rise in English agricultural prices.
80  But such rents were only for ‘new
takings’, and from only two estates;  indeed, rents on new takings on crown lands rose far less: 2.93 fold from
1510-19 to 1600-09 (when that series ends).  To meet the obvious objection that so much land was in the form
of copyhold tenures with fixed customary rents, he replied that ‘the rise in rent took largely the form of
increased entry fines’ [i.e., an inheritance tax paid by the new tenant]. That reply ignores the obvious fact that
such increases could take place only every seven, fourteen, or twenty-one years (or after an actual lifetime)
at best.
81  
An English industrial ‘capitalist’ who required land would presumably have leased it by a contract
that, for a number of years – say, five, ten, or twenty (or even ninety-nine) -- would have established a fixed
rent in current pounds sterling.  If, during that same period, he benefited from rising prices for his product, he
would thus have gained from cheaper real rents.  In response to the query ‘what industrial capitalists’, one may
cite not only the preceding facts but also the crucial fact that iron, coal, and copper mines, blast furnaces and
refining forges, shipyards, etc., all required the use of land, someone’s lands, which were so often rented (and,
if owned by the capitalist, involved implicit rents). 
In sum, such meagre evidence at hand would suggest that if industrial entrepreneurs could periodically
have gained from cheaper real rents during inflationary eras, such gains were probably less than those to be
derived from a fall in real interest rates.  In any search for ‘profit inflation’ during the Price Revolution era,
especially in north-west, the positive economic gains of inflation, especially in promoting larger-scale, more
capital intensive forms of industry – the heart of both the Hamilton and Nef theses – are to be found in the
ways in which it cheapened factor costs for the industrial entrepreneur: in capital, land, and labour, in that
order – and without any convincing evidence concerning relative labour costs.29
82  For detailed evidence on mint profitability, in late-medieval Flanders, and elsewhere, see Munro,
Wool, Cloth, and Gold (n.  29, above):   chapter 1: ‘Late Medieval Monetary Policies and the Economics of
Bullionism’, pp.  11-41; pp.  43-92, Tables B-K, pp.  190-212; other studies republished in John Munro,
Bullion Flows and Monetary Policies in England and the Low Countries, 1350 - 1500, Variorum Collected
Studies series CS 355 (Aldershot, Hampshire; and Brookfield, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 1992);
Peter Spufford, Money and Its Use in Medieval Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988),
chapter 13: ‘The Scourge of Debasement’, pp.  289-318; Peter Spufford, Monetary Problems and Policies
in the Burgundian Netherlands, 1433 - 1496 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1971), pp.  130-46, 214-16 (Appendix VI);
Hans Van Werveke, ‘Currency Manipulation in the Middle Ages:  The Case of Louis de Male, Count of
Flanders’, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 4th ser. 31 (1949), 115-127, reprinted in his
Miscellanea Mediaevalia Hans Van Werveke, Miscellanea Mediaevalia: Verspreide opstellen over
economische en sociale geschiedenis van de middeleeuwn (Ghent: E.  Story-Scientia, 1968) , pp. 255-67. 
83   For medieval coinages, see also Philip Grierson, Numismatics (Oxford, 1975); Philip Grierson,
Les monnaies de moyen âge (Paris, 1976); Philip Grierson, Later Medieval Numismatics (11th - 16th
Centuries): Selected Studies (London: Variorium Reprints, 1979).  For views very contrary to those expressed
here,  see Arthur J. Rolnick, François R. Velde, and Warren E. Weber, ‘The Debasement Puzzle: An Essay
on Medieval Monetary History’, Journal of Economic History, 56:4 (December 1996), 789-808.   In my view
Appendix: Coinage Debasement in Early-Modern Western Europe
First, some clarification of the nature and consequences of coinage debasement must be fully
understood, all the more so since this subject, vital to this article, is far too often badly or even wrongly
presented in the literature of European economic history.  Debasement simply means the reduction of the
quantity of precious metal contained in the currently circulating coins, and in particular in the silver coin – e.g.,
the penny – that provides the direct link between the coinage and the local money-of-account: e.g., the English
pound sterling, the French livre tournois, the Flemish pond groot, the Spanish ducat (= 375 maravedís).  Such
reductions took place by either a reduction in the weight of the coin itself, or in its silver fineness (i.e. by
adding proportionately more base metal — copper), or commonly by both methods combined.  The
consequence was to increase the number of coins with a given face value – e.g., the penny, or the shilling (12d)
– that was minted from a pound or marc weight of commercially silver; and that meant as well that nominal
money-of-account value of that pound or marc of silver also correspondingly increased.  That increase in the
coins produced was shared between the merchants suppling  bullion to the mint, by the mint-master (in his
brassage fees), and by the prince (in his seignorage fees – as a tax on coinage).  
The objective of a debasement was to induce – by prospects of increased profits – a much greater
influx of precious metals into the prince’s mint: from both domestic and foreign bullion and coins
(demonetized).  The prince’s often substantially augmented mint profits came from two sources: the substantial
increases in bullion influxes and thus in the mint outputs themselves;  and usually also from an increase in the
rate of seigniorage.
82   Provided that each of these economic agents – endowed with asymmetric information
unavailable to the general public – spent these debased coins quickly, before any inflation ensued, they would
all achieve net real gains, in terms of extra goods and serviced acquired.
 A major consideration in the success of late-medieval and early-modern debasements was the crudity
in the  mechanics of minting:  using hammers, dies, and shears, to produce what is known as ‘hammered
coinage’ (as opposed to more modern mechanically ‘milled’ coinages).   The consequence was  that
individually cut coins of the same face value were never exactly identical to any other coins of the same issue.
Thus, minor changes in fineness and weight were difficult to  detect, even for those few merchants who had
scales and touchstones.  Almost all of the populace accepted coin by ‘tale’, at ‘face value’, and for that value.
8330
– and in the view of many of my colleagues in medieval monetary history – their arguments and supposed
evidence are complete and utter nonsense.  But it would require another and complex article to refute them
effectively.  Otherwise see the publications in n.  82, above.
84   The silver coinage of the later-medieval and early-modern Low Countries was based on the
French  marc argent-le-roy = 244.753 g.,   of commercially fine silver, composed of 12 deniers argent le roy,
with 24 grains per denier =  23/24 or 95.833% pure. For example, the Flemish silver-coinage debasement
of November 1428 involved: (1) a reduction in the silver fineness from 50.00% (6 deniers argent-le-roy) to
44.44% commercially fine silver (5 deniers 8 grains)  – or, from 47.92% to 42.59% pure silver; and a
reduction in weight, from 3.599 grams (68 cut to the marc) to 3.573 grams (68.5 to the marc).  That meant
an overall loss of  a 11.76% reduction in the pure silver content of the dubbel groot or 2d coin (from 1.725
g. to 1.522 g.).  That in turn  resulted in a 13.32% increase in the nominal money-of-account value of the
traite:  from 22.667s. (22s.8d.) to 25.6875s. (25s.8d.6m.) per fine silver marc argent-le-roy.  The  merchant
selling bullion received 144 dubbel groot coins – an increase of 17 over the previous mint price (127  dubbel
groot coins); the prince’s seigniorage increased from 2 to 3 dubbel groot coins: a 50% increase; but the mint-
master’s brassage increased only from 7 to 7.125 dubbel groot coins.  That should refute the common notion
that mint-masters were responsible for instigating debasements.  The prince was.  From 1427-28 to 1428-29,
in the Burgundian Low Countries, the duke’s seigniorage revenues increased from £815 groot to £3,582
groot.  See Munro, Wool, Cloth, and Gold, pp.  77-83 (Table III, on p.  83), p.  97 (graph IV), p.  99; and for
this example, John Munro, ‘Deflation and the Petty Coinage Problem in the Late-Medieval Economy: The
Case of Flanders, 1334 - 1484’, Explorations in Economic History, 25:4 (October 1988), 387-423: Table 1,
pp.  390-91; reprinted in Munro, Bullion Flows, no.  8.
85  This can also be expressed in terms of the Cambridge Cash Balances approach: M = k.P.y.  Here
M stands for high-powered money held in non-earning cash balances; and ‘k’ represents the fraction or share
Though inflation was generally the consequence of debasement, it was neither immediate nor
proportional.  The common assumption that a 10 percent debasement would quickly lead to a 10 percent rise
in prices is simply false.  In the first place, the mathematical relationship involves reciprocals, so that a 10.00
percent reduction of the silver contents of a penny would lead to a 11.11 percent increase in the coined value
of a pound of fine silver.   The formula for this inversely proportional relationship is: 
 T (traite) = [1/(1 - x)] - 1,
in which x is the percentage reduction in the silver content of the penny or other coin linked to the money-of-
account: the pound of 20 shillings and 240 pence (with 12d to the shilling).  The traite – here, for the silver
coinage –  is the coined value of the mint weight of silver.  Its formula is: 
T = tM.V/F: 
in which tM = the taille or number of coins cut per marc; V = the nominal or face value of the coin; and F =
the fineness or purity of the coin, expressed as a percentage of commercial purity of the silver.
84 
Second, and on the other hand, my regression analyses of the relationships between  coinage
debasements and price changes in fifteenth-century Flanders indicate that in virtually every case, the
consequent, time-lagged rise in prices was less than the expected percentage increase.  
Third, the consequent inflation, if principally the result of the increase in the circulating money supply,
has to be understood in terms of the modernized form of the quantity theory: M.V = P.y.  Thus any inflationary
rise in P (Consumer Price Index) from of an increase in M – principally the coined money supply – could have
been offset by a reduction in V – the income velocity of money – and also by an induced or autonomous rise
in ‘y’: i.e., the real value of the Net National Product or Net National Income. 
85 In sum, while coinage31
of Net National Income (y) that the public chooses to hold in such cash balances, and is thus a measure of
Keynesian Liquidity Preference.  According to Keynes, ‘k’ is very sensitive to real interest rates, so that ‘k’
will decline with a rise of real interest rates, since the opportunity cost of holding cash balances is the
foregone interest or other investment income.  V, as the income velocity of money, is the mathematical
reciprocal of ‘k’: i.e., as V falls, ‘k’ rises.  A fall in V may reflect the public’s reaction to an increased supply
of money, thereby reducing the need to economise on its use; at the same, such an increase in M – ceteris
paribus – should lead to a fall in interest rates, thus reducing the opportunity cost of holding cash balances,
and thus leading – again – to a rise in ‘k’: qed [quod erat demonstrandum].
86  Van der Wee, Growth of the Antwerp Market,  Vol. I: Statistics,  Monetary Tables: Table XV,  pp.
126-29.
87 See Christopher Challis, ‘The Circulating Medium and the Movement of Prices in Mid-Tudor
England’, in Peter Ramsey, ed., The Price Revolution in Sixteenth-Century England (London, 1971),
pp. 117-46;  Christopher Challis, ‘Spanish Bullion and Monetary Inflation in England in the Later Sixteenth
Century’, Journal of European Economic History, 4 (1975), 381-92; Christopher Challis, The Tudor Coinage
(Manchester, 1978); Christopher Challis, ‘Les trésors d'Espagne et l'inflation  monétaire en Angleterre à la
fin du XVIe siècle’,  in John Day, ed., Etudes d'histoire monétaire, XIIe - XIXe siècles (Lille, 1984), pp. 179 -
91; Christopher Challis, Currency and the Economy in Tudor and Early Stuart England (Oxford and New
York: Oxford University Press, 1989); Christopher Challis, ‘Lord Hastings to the Great Silver Recoinage,
1464 - 1699’, in Christopher Challis, ed., A New History of the Royal Mint (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1992), pp.  179-397; J.  D. Gould, The Great Debasement: Currency and the Economy in
Mid-Tudor England (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970). 
debasements in late-medieval and early modern Europe almost always had a delayed inflationary consequence
the extent of debasement was always less than that expected from the reduction of the precious metals contents
of the coinage, and for these reasons.
The contrast of the debasements  in the three countries considered here is very striking.  For the sake
of comparison, let us begin with the worst offender of the three countries mentioned.  In the southern Low
Countries, which included the duchy of Brabant, the Burgundian-Habsburg governments debased the silver
coinage – in both fineness and weight – a total of twelve times from 1521 to 1644: reducing the  fine silver
content of penny and thus of the pond groot from 0.33 g.  to 0.17 g., for an overall loss of 48.5 percent (and
thus a 94.17 per cent increase in the money-of-account value of the coined silver marc.)
86 
In England, for the entire period of the Price Revolution, from ca. 1520 to 1650, its silver coinage and
pound sterling money-of-account  lost 35.5 percent of their silver contents.  Virtually all and even more of that
loss occurred during the Henrician ‘Great Debasement’ of 1544-1553. When the Great Debasement had
reached its nadir under Henry VIII’s successor (Northumberland, regent for Edward VI), in June 1553, the fine
silver contents of the penny had been reduced (in both weight and fineness) to just 0.108 g.  fine silver:  for
an overall reduction in the silver content of 83.1 percent  from that contained in the previous coinage, issued
in 1526.   In 1560-61, Elizabeth I reformed the badly debased coinage:  by reminting all of the circulating
silver coins into those of sterling silver fineness of 92.50 per cent (with 7.50 percent copper):  so that the penny
now contained 0.480 g fine silver (i.e., 75.1 percent of the silver in the 1526 coinage).  The English silver
coinage remained untouched until July 1601, when its weight and fine silver contents were reduced by a very
modest 3.23 per cent.  Thereafter the English silver coinage remained untouched until 1817:  when the silver
contents were reduced, for a final time,  by another 6.06 percent.
87 32
88  From 1488 to 1646, the grams of fine silver represented in the livre tournois had declined from
20.455 g to 8.687 g: an overall decline of 57.53 percent.  Data extracted from tables in Adrian  Blanchet and
Alphonse Dieudonné, Manuel de numismatique française, 2 vols.  (Paris: Ricard, 1916), Vol.  II.   For  further
details, see Munro, ‘Money and Coinage: Western Europe’,  pp. 174-184 (n.  1 above).
89  From 1497 to 1686, the Spanish crown consistently minted (with one exceptional, minor deviation
in 1642-43) two silver coins at 93.06 percent fineness.  The first and most important was  the Real, with
3.195g pure silver (67 cut from an alloyed marc of 230.0465 g., with a silver fineness of 11 dineros and 4
grains = 93.056%) and a nominal money-of-account value of  34 maravedís (375 to the ducat money of
account; 350 to the peso money of account). In fact, it differed from the earlier Real, struck from 1471, only
in its money-account-value, having been raised from 31 to 34 maravedís.  The second, also struck from 1497,
was the heavy-weight Real known as the ‘piece of eight (real de a ocho), with just over eight times as much
fine silver, 25.997 g, and a value of 272 maravedís.  In 1686, it was subjected to a very minor weight
reduction that reduced its fine silver content to 25.919 g.  The American dollar can trace its descent from this
Spanish coin.  Hamilton, American Treasure (1934), chapter III, pp.  46-72;  Hamilton, War and Prices in
Spain, 1651-1800, chapter II, pp.9-35; Modesto Ulloa, ‘Castilian Seignorage and Coinage in the Reign of
Philip II’, Journal of European Economic History, 4 (1975), 459-80; Akira Motomura, ‘The Best and Worst
of Currencies: Seigniorage and Currency Policy in Spain, 1597 - 1650’, The Journal of Economic History,
54:1 (March 1994), 104 - 27; Akira Motomura, ‘New Data on Minting, Seigniorage, and the Money Supply
in Spain (Castile), 1597 - 1643’, Explorations in Economic History, 34:3 (July 1997),  331-67; Munro,
‘Money and Coinage: Western Europe’, pp. 174-184.
90  See n.  82 above.
Across the Channel (La Manche), in France, monetary changes were far more complex.  Its silver
coinage had become so impoverished from successive debasements over the course of the fifteenth century
that the penny known as the  denier tournois was no longer a useful coin, and the government  replaced it as
the standard or link coin for the money-of-account (livre tournois) with the blanc couronne or  douzain (= 12d
tournois, in effect the shilling).   Strengthened in 1488, to contain 1.023 g pure silver, it remained unaltered
until 1519, when Francis I’s minor debasement (reducing slightly both fineness and weight) diminished its fine
silver content by 11.72 percent to 0.903 g.  When this coin underwent its final alteration in 1572, it had lost
another 22.18 percent of its fine silver (with only 0.703 g) , so that it contained only 78.01 percent of the silver
in the 1488 blanc couronne.  Thereafter, with an entirely new series of silver coinages, the fine silver contents
were even more drastically reduced, so that at the end of the Price Revolution era, the prevailing French silver
coin, the écu blanc (of 1646) contained less than half the silver of the 1488 blanc couronne: i.e., just 42.47
percent – but still slightly less than the overall extent of Habsburg debasements.
88
Finally, we come to Spain, which had become a very significant anomaly in European monetary
history.  For,  unlike almost all other European countries of this era, Spain underwent no debasements of the
gold and silver coinages: none at all, remarkably, from 1497 to 1686. 
89   The principal reason for the absence
of coinage debasements was the  Spanish monarchy’s renunciation of mint profits: i.e., of the seignorage tax
on coinage.  For it must be fully understood that medieval and early-modern coinage debasements were
fundamentally undertaken not as a monetary but strictly as a fiscal policy – as already demonstrated – in order
to produce such seigniorage revenues.
90  That seignorage-renunciation policy – unique in Europe of this era
– had first been enunciated in Henry IV of Castile’s Pragmatica,  issued in 1471.  That renunciation was
deemed to be a necessary component of the crown’s monetary reform policy to suppress all competing baronial
mints (about 150); but not until Ferdinand and Isabella confirmed this Pragmatica in  1479, as joint rulers of
Castile (from 1474), was this policy finally put into practice.  With their new coinage of 1497, Ferdinand and
Isabella formally and forever revoked the recently united Spanish crown’s right to exact seigniorage on gold33
91  Ferdinand II of Aragon married Isabella of Castile in 1469; in 1474, they became joint rulers of
Castile; in 1479, Ferdinand became king of Aragon; and in 1492, the conquest of Muslim Granada completed
their effective unification of Spain.  Isabella died in 1504; Ferdinand, in 1516, bequeathing his rule to his
grandson, who became the Holy Roman Emperor Charles V, in 1519.
92  For the monetary details, see  Marie-Thérèse Boyer-Xambeu, Ghislain Deleplace, and Lucien
Gillard, Private Money and Public Currencies: The 16
th Century Challenge, trans.  by Azizeh Azodi: from
Monnaie privée et pouvoir des princes: l’économie des relations monétaire à la Renaissance ( Paris: Editions
de CNRS, 1986) (London: M.E. Sharpe, 1994), pp.  109-111.  Another reason may be found in  Spufford,
Money and Its Use, p.  314: he notes that from about 1354  to 1471, the Castilian silver coinage had lost about
95 percent of its fine metal contents, ‘a greater long-term fall in value than that of any other European
money’.  See also Table 5 (p.  295) and the monetary graphs on pp.  296-99. 
93  Europe’s first entirely-copper petty coinage was issued not in Habsburg Spain but in the Habsburg
Netherlands, in 1543: H.  E. Van Gelder and Marcel Hoc, Les monnaies des Pays-Bas bourguignons et
espagn;ols, 1434-1713: Répertoire générale (Amsterdam, 1960); Van der Wee, Antwerp Market, vol.  I, pp.
123-35;  Munro, ‘Money and Coinage: Western Europe’, pp.  174-84.
94 The Castilian  blanca  issued in 1471 had a silver fineness of 10 grains or 3.47%, weighing 1.107g.
 The silver fineness was based on theoretical purity of 12 dineros, with 24 grains each, and thus a total of 288
grains.  The weight was defined as the number cut from an alloyed  marc of 230.0465 grams.  See  Hamilton,
American Treasure, pp.  49-64.
95  Ibid.,  pp.  49-64.  See also the sources cited in n.  2, 14, 24, and 93 above.
and silver coins.
91  Any royal revenue losses from foregone seigniorage were more than made up by the duties
imposed on the importation of precious metals from the Americas.
92
The absence of both seigniorage and debasement in Spain’s silver and gold coinages did not apply,
however, to its petty coinage: the previously mentioned vellon, largely and then finally entirely copper, whose
role in the Spanish Price Revolution became so very important in the seventeenth century.
93  From at least
1471, the Castilian and then Spanish kings had issued a largely copper fractional coinage called blancas, with
a nominal money-of-account value of 0.5 maravedí (compared to a value of 34 maravedís for the silver real):
but with a very small amount of silver 10 grains = 3.47 percent),  to convince the public that it was indeed
precious-metal ‘money’.
94  In 1497, that fineness was reduced to 2.43 percent (7 grains);  in 1552, to  1.909
percent (5.5 grains); in 1566, to 1.39 percent (4 grains); in  1583, to a fineness of just 1.39 percent (containing
only 0.0146 g silver), and a nominal value 0.5 maravedís.  Subsequently, in 1597,  Philip II (r.1556-1598)
agreed to the issue of a coin worth exactly one maravedí , with a fineness of only 0.34 percent (just 1 grain
of silver); but whether any were actually issued is not clear.  
In 1599, the new king Philip III (r. 1598-1621) issued Spain’s first purely copper coin:   140 coins
struck per copper marc of 230.0465 g.  But shortly after,  from 1602, it was then minted with only half as
much copper: at 280 per marc). Certainly some of the ensuing inflation in seventeenth-century Spain, with a
widening gap between nominal and silver-based prices, ranging from 4.0 percent in 1620 to 104.2 percent in
1650, has to be explained by such issues of copper vellon coinages.
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Table 1. Composite Price Indices of Flanders, Brabant, England, Spain (Castile)                                                          
in quinquennial means: 1401-05 to 1595-1600                                                                                           
Indices: mean of 1451-75 = 100; and mean of 1501-10 = 100                                                                        
Years FLANDERS BRABANT ENGLAND BRABANT ENGLAND SPAIN SPAIN
5 yr means 1451-75=100 1451-75=100 1451-75=100 1501-10=100 1501-10=100 1501-10=100 1501-10=100
Silver Vellon fr 1597
1401-05 88.531 64.269 114.840 53.501 109.078
1406-10 105.261 68.552 111.235 57.067 105.654
1411-15 95.309 73.971 108.105 61.578 102.681
1416-20 107.381 80.542 113.403 67.049 107.713
1421-25 112.182 90.193 101.476 75.082 96.384
1426-30 117.773 100.153 112.267 83.374 106.634
1431-35 123.512 102.759 108.475 85.543 103.032
1436-40 140.166 125.432 122.010 104.418 115.888
1441-45 113.504 105.477 92.525 87.806 87.883
1446-50 109.984 99.577 100.900 82.894 95.837
1451-55 100.902 98.545 100.250 82.035 95.220
1456-60 117.855 114.577 97.055 95.382 92.185
1461-65 88.705 91.070 102.733 75.813 97.578
1466-70 96.520 96.953 106.745 80.710 101.389
1471-75 96.017 98.854 97.755 82.293 92.850
1476-80 117.213 120.693 90.055 100.473 85.537
1481-85 156.853 155.752 127.380 129.658 120.989
1486-90 184.511 174.098 102.770 144.931 97.614
1491-95 144.981 133.216 106.795 110.898 101.437
1496-00 100.255 115.352 96.700 96.026 91.848
1501-05 125.449 106.793 104.432 101.434 92.433 92.433
1506-10 114.801 103.773 95.568 98.566 107.569 107.569
1511-15 137.904 108.520 114.800 103.075 98.981 98.981
1516-20 150.264 120.438 125.090 114.395 104.280 104.280
1521-25 179.938 146.045 149.792 138.717 122.139 122.13946
Years FLANDERS BRABANT ENGLAND BRABANT ENGLAND SPAIN SPAIN
5 yr means 1451-75=100 1451-75=100 1451-75=100 1501-10=100 1501-10=100 1501-10=100 1501-10=100
Silver Vellon fr 1597
1526-30 178.519 157.345 148.611 149.450 131.573 131.573
1531-35 173.995 155.640 144.845 147.831 132.444 132.444
1536-40 185.641 152.330 154.540 144.687 138.734 138.734
1541-45 208.340 176.545 173.435 167.687 147.904 147.904
1546-50 199.420 229.640 166.010 218.118 165.892 165.892
1551-55 260.515 275.453 216.870 261.633 176.023 176.023
1556-60 300.717 315.846 250.337 299.999 194.006 194.006
1561-65 313.937 289.311 261.342 274.795 223.434 223.434
1566-70 318.290 292.292 264.965 277.627 227.728 227.728
1571-75 423.432 296.095 352.492 281.239 246.766 246.766
1576-80 480.716 336.495 400.179 319.612 247.816 247.816
1581-85 617.424 337.515 513.984 320.580 269.068 269.068
1586-90 799.754 387.170 665.767 367.744 274.969 274.969
1591-95 688.333 416.010 573.013 395.137 284.424 284.424
1596-00 752.946 540.540 626.801 513.419 320.973 320.982
1601-05 612.324 461.265 509.738 438.121 349.918 352.430
1606-10 615.893 496.995 512.709 472.059 330.114 335.311
1611-15 636.132 532.840 529.557 506.105 316.813 322.676
1616-20 626.963 520.390 521.925 494.280 328.561 335.642
1621-25 815.752 529.720 679.085 503.142 317.853 344.721
1626-30 919.647 525.060 765.574 498.715 328.044 410.813
1631-35 908.534 608.383 756.322 577.857 329.905 395.126
1636-40 967.668 615.125 805.549 584.261 323.466 409.666
1641-45 987.167 560.495 821.781 532.372 313.495 432.481
1646-50 1015.138 734.390 845.067 697.542 343.360 457.094
Sources :
For Spain (1501-1650):  47
Earl J. Hamilton, ‘American Treasure and the Rise of Capitalism, 1500-1700’, Economica, 27 (Nov. 1929), 338-57; Earl Hamilton, American
Treasure and the Price Revolution in Spain, 1501-1650 (Cambridge, Mass., 1934; reissued 1965), Chapter XII: ‘Wages: Money and Real’,  pp.
262-82; and Chapter XIII: 'Why Prices Rose’, pp. 283-308; Appendices (pp. 309-403), with statistical tables on prices and wages.   I have changed
the base from the original, 1581-90  = 100, to the one used in these tables: 1501-10 = 100.
For Brabant (Southern Netherlands) (1401-1650)
Herman Van der Wee, Growth of the Antwerp Market and the European Economy, 14th to 16th Centuries, 3 Vols. (The Hague, 1963). Vol. I: 
Statistics; and Vol. III: Graphs.
Herman Van der Wee, ‘Prijzen en lonen als ontwikkelingsvariabelen: Een vergelijkend onderzoek tussen Engeland en de Zuidelijke Nederlanden,
1400 - 1700’, in Album offert à Charles Verlinden à l'occasion de ses trente ans de professoriat (Wetteren: Universum,  1975), pp. 413-35.  English
translation:  ‘Prices and Wages as Development Variables: A Comparison Between England and the Southern Netherlands, 1400-1700’, Acta
Historia Neerlandica, 10 (1978), 58-78, republished in Herman Van der Wee, The Low Countries in the Early Modern World, translated by
Lizabeth Fackelman, Variorum Publications (Aldershot, 1993), pp. 223-41. Only the Dutch version in this original publication contains the specific
annual data in tabular form.  
I have changed the base from the original, 1451-75 = 100, to the one used in these tables: 1501-10 = 100.48
For Flanders (1401-1500): 
John H.  Munro, ‘Wage-Stickiness, Monetary Changes, and Real Incomes in Late-Medieval England and the Low Countries, 1300 - 1500:  Did
Money Matter?’ Research in Economic History, 21 (2003), Table 8, pp.  249-50.  Note that these index numbers are based on my revised
calculations and thus differ, marginally, from those that I had provided in some earlier publications.
For England (1401-1650):
E.H. Phelps Brown and Sheila V. Hopkins, ‘Seven Centuries of Building Wages’, Economica, 22 (August 1955), reprinted in E.H. Phelps Brown
and Sheila V. Hopkins, A Perspective of Wages and Prices (London, 1981), pp. 1-12.
E.H. Phelps Brown and S.V. Hopkins, ‘Seven Centuries of the Prices of Consumables Compared with Builders’ Wage-Rates’, Economica, 23(Nov.
1956), reprinted in E.H. Phelps Brown and Sheila V. Hopkins, A Perspective of Wages and Prices (London, 1981),  pp. 13-59, containing
additional statistical appendices not provided in the original publication, or in earlier reprints.  I have corrected a number of the indices from the
Phelps Brown Papers Collection, now housed in the Archives of the British Library of Political and Economic Science (LSE), in uncatalogued
boxes; and I have also interpolated missing data in their annual series, for both prices and wages.
Although I have now reconstructed their price indexes, following the methodology of Herman Van der Wee, with commodity weights dependent on
changes in relative prices, I have not yet published this revised series of the Phelps Brown and Hopkins ‘Basket of Consumables’, and have used
their original index numbers, using fixed commodity price shares, though corrected as indicated above.49
Table 2.
SPAIN :  Prices and Wages,  in quinquennial means, 1501-05 to 1646-50
Base: 1501-10 = 100
Composite Composite Spanish Money-Wage Real Wage
Price Index Price Index Grain Price Index Index
Years Based on  Based on  Index harmonic
CPI: A (Silver) CPI: B (Vellon means
after 1600)
1501-05 92.43 92.43 92.71 95.34 103.13
1506-10 107.57 107.57 107.29 104.66 96.88
1511-15 98.98 98.98 84.55 110.35 111.49
1516-20 104.28 104.28 80.43 115.29 110.54
1521-25 122.14 122.14 102.22 120.69 98.82
1526-30 131.57 131.57 139.50 120.85 91.78
1531-35 132.44 132.45 117.12 124.03 93.58
1536-40 138.73 138.74 119.88 130.86 94.33
1541-45 147.90 147.90 132.52 136.01 91.93
1546-50 165.89 165.89 163.72 146.08 88.08
1551-55 176.02 176.02 140.61 166.71 94.51
1556-60 194.01 194.01 200.78 188.23 96.93
1561-65 223.43 223.43 197.18 204.35 91.44
1566-70 227.73 227.73 206.47 216.32 94.90
1571-75 246.77 246.76 213.74 220.43 89.33
1576-80 247.82 247.82 262.76 231.26 93.37
1581-85 269.07 269.07 305.17 249.77 92.82
1586-90 274.97 274.98 282.63 267.03 97.07
1591-95 284.42 284.43 326.09 275.05 96.71
1596-00 320.98 320.98 366.41 278.60 86.84
1601-05 349.92 352.43 347.68 350.15 99.20
1606-10 330.12 335.31 400.39 372.46 111.0550
SPAIN :  Prices and Wages,  in quinquennial means, 1501-05 to 1646-50
Base: 1501-10 = 100
Composite Composite Spanish Money-Wage Real Wage
Price Index Price Index Grain Price Index Index
Years Based on  Based on  Index harmonic
CPI: A (Silver) CPI: B (Vellon means
after 1600)
1611-15 316.82 322.68 318.28 373.24 115.66
1616-20 328.56 335.64 384.67 374.11 111.45
1621-25 317.86 344.72 355.10 371.34 107.70
1626-30 328.05 410.81 435.91 384.65 93.55
1631-35 329.91 395.13 419.20 400.84 101.44
1636-40 323.47 409.67 419.46 406.46 99.22
1641-45 313.50 432.48 466.09 403.92 93.40
1646-50 343.36 457.09 573.78 410.25 89.79
Sources :
Earl J. Hamilton, ‘American Treasure and the Rise of Capitalism, 1500-1700’, Economica, 27 (Nov. 1929), 338-57; Earl Hamilton, American
Treasure and the Price Revolution in Spain, 1501-1650 (Cambridge, Mass., 1934; reissued 1965), Chapter XII: 'Wages: Money and Real’,  pp.
262-82; and Chapter XIII: 'Why Prices Rose’, pp. 283-308; Appendices (pp. 309-403), with statistical tables on prices and wages.
I have changed the base from the original, 1581-90  = 100, to the one used in these tables: 1501-10 = 100.51
Table 3.
ENGLAND : Prices and Wage Indices,  in quinquennial means, 1501-05 to 1656-60
Base: 1501 - 10  = 100
Index A Index B Index C Daily Money Bldg Craftsmen: Bldg Craftsmen:
PBH        PBH PBH PBH Doughty Wage in d. Nominal Wage Real Wage 
Years Farinaceous Fish, Meat Ind Price Composite Industrial for Master Index for Master Index
Price Index Dairy Product Index Price Index Price Index Mason, Carp Mason/Carpenter harmonic mean
1501-05 109.40 92.52 101.18 101.43 100.40 6.00 100.00 98.59
1506-10 90.60 107.48 98.82 98.57 99.61 6.00 100.00 101.46
1511-15 98.27 107.32 105.38 103.08 101.58 6.00 100.00 97.02
1516-20 113.69 119.48 106.20 114.39 104.74 6.00 100.00 87.42
1521-25 128.43 165.34 110.14 138.72 114.03 6.00 100.00 72.09
1526-30 163.17 149.62 119.34 149.45 119.57 6.00 100.00 66.91
1531-35 154.12 155.49 119.53 147.83 111.46 6.00 100.00 67.65
1536-40 141.52 159.28 123.66 144.69 115.81 6.50 108.33 74.87
1541-45 145.54 213.07 129.00 167.69 126.48 6.90 115.00 68.60
1546-50 210.34 263.07 149.06 218.12 157.71 7.20 120.00 55.01
1551-55 255.79 311.55 178.87 261.63 189.72 8.40 140.00 53.40
1556-60 359.82 292.61 184.21 300.00 209.09 9.60 160.00 52.92
1561-65 264.01 319.95 211.88 274.79 230.24 10.00 166.67 60.65
1566-70 265.50 322.25 218.64 277.63 224.11 10.00 166.67 60.03
1571-75 273.83 322.29 218.83 281.24 234.78 10.20 170.00 60.55
1576-80 353.75 329.61 226.36 319.61 240.91 11.40 190.00 59.40
1581-85 337.61 342.42 241.84 320.58 243.68 12.00 200.00 62.39
1586-90 401.01 388.64 255.55 367.74 263.44 12.00 200.00 54.39
1591-95 436.29 421.78 254.83 395.14 270.55 12.00 200.00 50.62
1596-00 673.37 458.40 271.29 513.42 294.66 12.00 200.00 38.96
1601-05 494.99 458.33 275.98 438.12 282.81 12.00 200.00 45.65
1606-10 554.94 480.05 276.80 472.06 301.78 12.00 200.00 42.3752
ENGLAND : Prices and Wage Indices,  in quinquennial means, 1501-05 to 1656-60
Base: 1501 - 10  = 100
Index A Index B Index C Daily Money Bldg Craftsmen: Bldg Craftsmen:
PBH        PBH PBH PBH Doughty Wage in d. Nominal Wage Real Wage 
Years Farinaceous Fish, Meat Ind Price Composite Industrial for Master Index for Master Index
Price Index Dairy Product Index Price Index Price Index Mason, Carp Mason/Carpenter harmonic mean
1611-15 597.13 517.80 286.07 506.11 314.63 12.00 200.00 39.52
1616-20 555.38 530.81 291.74 494.28 302.77 12.00 200.00 40.46
1621-25 593.65 515.15 283.63 503.14 306.13 12.00 200.00 39.75
1626-30 573.47 521.46 292.88 498.72 328.85 12.20 203.33 40.82
1631-35 747.56 536.65 288.15 577.86 340.51 13.60 226.67 39.16
1636-40 728.40 568.56 301.28 584.26 349.80 14.90 248.33 42.45
1641-45 597.92 565.03 327.60 532.37 16.10 268.33 50.40
1646-50 885.22 675.63 331.89 697.54 17.00 283.33 40.69
1651-55 606.26 646.91 350.10 571.16 17.80 296.67 51.86
1656-60 710.97 633.33 336.62 608.13 18.00 300.00 49.3353
Table 3, continued
ENGLAND : Prices and Wage Indices,  in quinquennial means, 1501-05 to 1656-60
Base: 1501 - 10  = 100
Bldg Craftsmen: Ratio of Ratio of
Real Wage  Money Wages  to Money Wages to
Years Index PBH Ind Prices Doughty Ind Prices
harmonic mean harmonic means harmonic means
1501-05 98.586 98.831 99.606
1506-10 101.455 101.197 100.397
1511-15 97.017 94.891 98.444
1516-20 87.417 94.158 95.472
1521-25 72.089 90.794 87.695
1526-30 66.912 83.795 83.636
1531-35 67.645 83.660 89.716
1536-40 74.874 87.606 93.544
1541-45 68.599 89.109 90.950
1546-50 55.009 80.569 76.251
1551-55 53.397 78.042 73.678
1556-60 52.918 86.920 76.580
1561-65 60.651 78.662 72.389
1566-70 60.033 76.229 74.368
1571-75 60.549 77.579 72.365
1576-80 59.400 83.840 78.777
1581-85 62.387 82.699 82.076
1586-90 54.386 78.262 75.919
1591-95 50.615 78.484 73.923
1596-00 38.955 73.721 67.874
1601-05 45.649 72.470 70.720
1606-10 42.368 72.255 66.274
1611-15 39.517 69.913 63.56854
ENGLAND : Prices and Wage Indices,  in quinquennial means, 1501-05 to 1656-60
Base: 1501 - 10  = 100
Bldg Craftsmen: Ratio of Ratio of
Real Wage  Money Wages  to Money Wages to
Years Index PBH Ind Prices Doughty Ind Prices
harmonic mean harmonic means harmonic means
1616-20 40.463 68.553 66.057
1621-25 39.750 70.514 65.332
1626-30 40.823 69.448 61.806
1631-35 39.155 78.641 66.527
1636-40 42.454 82.380 70.956
1641-45 50.403 81.892
1646-50 40.694 85.364
1651-55 51.858 84.732
1656-60 49.332 89.120
Sources:  
E.H. Phelps Brown and Sheila V. Hopkins, ‘Seven Centuries of Building Wages’, Economica, 22 (August 1955), reprinted in E.H. Phelps Brown and
Sheila V. Hopkins, A Perspective of Wages and Prices (London, 1981), pp. 1-12.
E.H. Phelps Brown and S.V. Hopkins, ‘Seven Centuries of the Prices of Consumables Compared with Builders’ Wage-Rates’, Economica, 23(Nov.
1956), reprinted in E.H. Phelps Brown and Sheila V. Hopkins, A Perspective of Wages and Prices (London, 1981),  pp. 13-59, containing additional
statistical appendices not provided in the original publication, or in earlier reprints.  I have corrected a number of the indices from the Phelps Brown
Papers Collection, now housed in the Archives of the British Library of Political and Economic Science (LSE), in uncatalogued boxes; and I have also
interpolated missing data in their annual series, for both prices and wages.
Robert Doughty, ‘Industrial Prices and Inflation in Southern England, 1401-1640’, Explorations in Economic History, 12 (1975), 177-92.55
Table 4.
BRABANT : Prices and Wage Indices,  in quinquennial means, 1501-05 to 1671-75
Base: 1501 - 10  = 100
Index A Index B Index C NWI:IPI
Year Van der Wee Van der Wee Van der Wee Van der Wee Nominal Wage Real Wage  Ratio of
Farinaceous Fish, Meat Industrial Price Composite Index for Master Index NWIndex
Price Index Dairy Product Index Price Index Bldg Craftsmen harmonic to Ind Pr Ind
harmonic
1501-05 111.58 102.84 97.06 104.43 100.00 95.76 103.03
1506-10 88.42 97.17 102.94 95.57 100.00 104.64 97.14
1511-15 120.77 109.15 114.72 114.80 109.80 95.35 95.21
1516-20 132.95 125.53 113.89 125.09 122.45 97.89 107.52
1521-25 177.08 141.01 125.42 149.79 124.08 82.77 99.01
1526-30 165.86 148.36 125.74 148.61 126.12 84.77 100.34
1531-35 169.81 155.39 96.38 144.85 122.86 84.82 127.43
1536-40 188.82 160.54 99.93 154.54 140.41 90.67 140.53
1541-45 207.27 178.37 120.93 173.44 155.92 90.12 128.75
1546-50 165.08 189.29 134.48 166.01 182.04 109.70 135.37
1551-55 265.14 220.08 147.36 216.87 193.47 89.22 131.35
1556-60 290.38 265.82 174.62 250.34 214.29 84.53 123.07
1561-65 317.75 260.13 187.10 261.34 349.39 133.32 185.56
1566-70 303.44 278.29 194.41 264.97 291.02 109.04 148.80
1571-75 456.11 332.19 241.57 352.49 284.90 80.60 117.68
1576-80 526.58 374.13 266.68 400.18 433.47 106.53 160.93
1581-85 644.31 530.17 315.71 513.98 531.43 100.88 166.38
1586-90 993.01 564.57 367.68 665.77 484.90 72.34 131.79
1591-95 734.25 583.85 340.66 573.01 499.59 87.51 146.58
1596-00 844.29 622.11 340.58 626.80 548.57 87.43 160.84
1601-05 616.45 526.41 342.57 509.74 587.76 115.31 171.5756
Index A Index B Index C NWI:IPI
Year Van der Wee Van der Wee Van der Wee Van der Wee Nominal Wage Real Wage  Ratio of
Farinaceous Fish, Meat Industrial Price Composite Index for Master Index NWIndex
Price Index Dairy Product Index Price Index Bldg Craftsmen harmonic to Ind Pr Ind
harmonic
1606-10 640.44 505.79 350.48 512.71 587.76 114.64 167.70
1611-15 692.39 501.40 349.97 529.56 587.76 110.99 167.95
1616-20 606.91 541.17 380.40 521.93 587.76 112.61 154.51
1621-25 910.44 657.27 398.31 679.09 587.76 86.55 147.56
1626-30 1023.08 773.31 407.96 765.57 587.76 76.77 144.07
1631-35 960.52 797.65 423.18 756.32 587.76 77.71 138.89
1636-40 1053.89 819.47 451.57 805.55 587.76 72.96 130.16
1641-45 994.05 902.72 475.84 821.78 587.76 71.52 123.52
1646-50 1070.59 897.76 467.21 845.07 587.76 69.55 125.80
1651-55 914.34 833.43 421.83 752.82 587.76 78.07 139.33
1656-60 850.72 779.25 393.55 702.16 587.76 83.71 149.35
Sources:   see sources for Tables 1 and 5.57
Table 5.
BRABANT : Prices and Wages in d groot Brabant,  in quinquennial means, 1501-05 to 1671-75
With the Composite Price and Money Wage Index:  Base: 1501 - 10  = 100
Grains: Meat: Industrial:
Year Van der Wee Van der Wee Van der Wee Van der Wee Van der Wee Master Nominal
Farinaceous Fish, Meat Industrial  Composite Composite Builder's Wage Index
prices in d prices in d prices in d prices in d Price Index Daily
groot Brab groot Brab groot Brab groot Brab 1501-10 = 100 Wage in d gr 1501-10 = 100
1501-05 111.8 107.7 72.2 291.70 104.43 12.25 100.00
1506-10 88.6 101.8 76.6 266.94 95.57 12.25 100.00
1511-15 121.0 114.4 85.3 320.66 114.80 13.45 109.80
1516-20 133.2 131.5 84.7 349.40 125.09 15.00 122.45
1521-25 177.4 147.7 93.3 418.40 149.79 15.20 124.08
1526-30 166.1 155.4 93.5 415.10 148.61 15.45 126.12
1531-35 170.1 162.8 71.7 404.58 144.85 15.05 122.86
1536-40 189.1 168.2 74.3 431.66 154.54 17.20 140.41
1541-45 207.6 186.9 90.0 484.44 173.44 19.10 155.92
1546-50 165.3 198.3 100.0 463.70 166.01 22.30 182.04
1551-55 265.6 230.6 109.6 605.76 216.87 23.70 193.47
1556-60 290.8 278.5 129.9 699.24 250.34 26.25 214.29
1561-65 318.3 272.5 139.2 729.98 261.34 42.80 349.39
1566-70 303.9 291.6 144.6 740.10 264.97 35.65 291.02
1571-75 456.8 348.0 179.7 984.58 352.49 34.90 284.90
1576-80 527.4 392.0 198.4 1117.78 400.18 53.10 433.47
1581-85 645.3 555.5 234.9 1435.66 513.98 65.10 531.43
1586-90 994.6 591.5 273.5 1859.62 665.77 59.40 484.90
1591-95 735.4 611.7 253.4 1600.54 573.01 61.20 499.59
1596-00 845.6 651.8 253.4 1750.78 626.80 67.20 548.57
1601-05 617.4 551.5 254.8 1423.80 509.74 72.00 587.7658
Grains: Meat: Industrial:
Year Van der Wee Van der Wee Van der Wee Van der Wee Van der Wee Master Nominal
Farinaceous Fish, Meat Industrial  Composite Composite Builder's Wage Index
prices in d prices in d prices in d prices in d Price Index Daily
groot Brab groot Brab groot Brab groot Brab 1501-10 = 100 Wage in d gr 1501-10 = 100
1606-10 641.5 529.9 260.7 1432.10 512.71 72.00 587.76
1611-15 693.5 525.3 260.3 1479.16 529.56 72.00 587.76
1616-20 607.9 567.0 283.0 1457.84 521.93 72.00 587.76
1621-25 911.9 688.6 296.3 1896.82 679.09 72.00 587.76
1626-30 1024.7 810.2 303.5 2138.40 765.57 72.00 587.76
1631-35 962.1 835.7 314.8 2112.56 756.32 72.00 587.76
1636-40 1055.6 858.6 335.9 2250.06 805.55 72.00 587.76
1641-45 995.6 945.8 354.0 2295.40 821.78 72.00 587.76
1646-50 1072.3 940.6 347.6 2360.44 845.07 72.00 587.76
1651-55 915.8 873.2 313.8 2102.78 752.82 72.00 587.76
1656-60 852.1 816.4 292.8 1961.26 702.16 72.00 587.7659
Table 5, continued:
BRABANT : 
Prices and Wages in d groot Brabant,  in quinquennial means, 1501-05 to 1671-75
With the Composite Price and Money Wage Index:  Base: 1501 - 10  = 100
Master's Annual Real Wage: Real Wage: Ratio of Money Ratio of Money
Year Wage Income in Commodity RWI = Wages to Wages to
(210 Days) Baskets NWI/CPI Industrial Industrial
in Commodity Harmonic Mean: Harmonic Mean Prices Prices
Baskets 1501-10 = 100 1501-10 = 100 arithmetic harmonic
1501-05 8.819 95.756 95.756 16.99% 16.97%
1506-10 9.637 104.638 104.638 16.03% 16.00%
1511-15 8.781 95.348 95.348 15.75% 15.68%
1516-20 9.015 97.889 97.889 17.71% 17.71%
1521-25 7.623 82.772 82.772 16.34% 16.30%
1526-30 7.807 84.766 84.766 16.54% 16.52%
1531-35 7.811 84.815 84.815 21.35% 20.98%
1536-40 8.351 90.674 90.674 23.29% 23.14%
1541-45 8.300 90.117 90.117 21.22% 21.20%
1546-50 10.104 109.703 109.703 22.34% 22.29%
1551-55 8.217 89.216 89.216 21.69% 21.63%
1556-60 7.785 84.525 84.525 20.39% 20.27%
1561-65 12.279 133.320 133.320 30.79% 30.56%
1566-70 10.043 109.041 109.041 24.71% 24.50%
1571-75 7.423 80.603 80.603 19.58% 19.38%
1576-80 9.811 106.529 106.529 26.70% 26.50%
1581-85 9.291 100.876 100.876 28.16% 27.40%
1586-90 6.662 72.340 72.340 21.96% 21.70%
1591-95 8.059 87.508 87.508 24.20% 24.14%60
Master's Annual Real Wage: Real Wage: Ratio of Money Ratio of Money
Year Wage Income in Commodity RWI = Wages to Wages to
(210 Days) Baskets NWI/CPI Industrial Industrial
in Commodity Harmonic Mean: Harmonic Mean Prices Prices
Baskets 1501-10 = 100 1501-10 = 100 arithmetic harmonic
1596-00 8.052 87.433 87.433 26.53% 26.49%
1601-05 10.619 115.305 115.305 28.26% 28.25%
1606-10 10.558 114.637 114.637 27.62% 27.62%
1611-15 10.222 110.990 110.990 27.69% 27.66%
1616-20 10.372 112.613 112.613 25.46% 25.44%
1621-25 7.971 86.551 86.551 24.39% 24.30%
1626-30 7.071 76.773 76.773 23.75% 23.72%
1631-35 7.157 77.712 77.712 22.93% 22.87%
1636-40 6.720 72.963 72.963 21.48% 21.43%
1641-45 6.587 71.522 71.522 20.49% 20.34%
1646-50 6.406 69.551 69.551 20.84% 20.72%
1651-55 7.190 78.074 78.074 22.96% 22.94%
1656-60 7.709 83.707 83.707 24.62% 24.59%
Sources:  
Herman Van der Wee, Growth of the Antwerp Market and the European Economy, 14th to 16th Centuries, 3 Vols. (The Hague, 1963). Vol. I:  Statistics;
and Vol. III: Graphs.
Herman Van der Wee, ‘Prijzen en lonen als ontwikkelingsvariabelen: Een vergelijkend onderzoek tussen Engeland en de Zuidelijke Nederlanden, 1400
- 1700’, in Album offert à Charles Verlinden à l'occasion de ses trente ans de professoriat (Wetteren: Universum,  1975), pp. 413-35.  English
translation:  ‘Prices and Wages as Development Variables: A Comparison Between England and the Southern Netherlands, 1400-1700’, Acta Historia
Neerlandica, 10 (1978), 58-78, republished in Herman Van der Wee, The Low Countries in the Early Modern World, translated by Lizabeth Fackelman,
Variorum Publications (Aldershot, 1993), pp. 223-41. Only the Dutch version in this original publication contains the specific annual data in tabular
form.  61
I have changed the base from the original, 1451-75 = 100, to the one used in these tables: 1501-10 = 100.62
Table 6
Comparison of Price and Nominal Wage Indices in Spain, Brabant, and England, 1501-05 to 1666-70
in quinquennial means, 1501-10 = 100
SPAIN SPAIN BRABANT BRABANT BRABANT BRABANT
Composite Money-Wage NWI:IPI: Ratio 
Price Index Index Van der Wee Van der Wee Nominal Wage of NWIndex
Years Based on  Composite Industrial Price Index for Master to Ind Pr Ind
CPI: B (Vellon Price Index Index Bldg Craftsmen harmonic
after 1600)
1501-05 92.43 95.34 104.43 97.06 100.00 103.03
1506-10 107.57 104.66 95.57 102.94 100.00 97.14
1511-15 98.98 110.35 114.80 114.72 109.80 95.21
1516-20 104.28 115.29 125.09 113.89 122.45 107.52
1521-25 122.14 120.69 149.79 125.42 124.08 99.01
1526-30 131.57 120.85 148.61 125.74 126.12 100.34
1531-35 132.45 124.03 144.85 96.38 122.86 127.43
1536-40 138.74 130.86 154.54 99.93 140.41 140.53
1541-45 147.90 136.01 173.44 120.93 155.92 128.75
1546-50 165.89 146.08 166.01 134.48 182.04 135.37
1551-55 176.02 166.71 216.87 147.36 193.47 131.35
1556-60 194.01 188.23 250.34 174.62 214.29 123.07
1561-65 223.43 204.35 261.34 187.10 349.39 185.56
1566-70 227.73 216.32 264.97 194.41 291.02 148.80
1571-75 246.76 220.43 352.49 241.57 284.90 117.68
1576-80 247.82 231.26 400.18 266.68 433.47 160.93
1581-85 269.07 249.77 513.98 315.71 531.43 166.38
1586-90 274.98 267.03 665.77 367.68 484.90 131.79
1591-95 284.43 275.05 573.01 340.66 499.59 146.58
1596-00 320.98 278.60 626.80 340.58 548.57 160.8463
Comparison of Price and Nominal Wage Indices in Spain, Brabant, and England, 1501-05 to 1666-70
in quinquennial means, 1501-10 = 100
SPAIN SPAIN BRABANT BRABANT BRABANT BRABANT
Composite Money-Wage NWI:IPI: Ratio 
Price Index Index Van der Wee Van der Wee Nominal Wage of NWIndex
Years Based on  Composite Industrial Price Index for Master to Ind Pr Ind
CPI: B (Vellon Price Index Index Bldg Craftsmen harmonic
after 1600)
1601-05 352.43 350.15 509.74 342.57 587.76 171.57
1606-10 335.31 372.46 512.71 350.48 587.76 167.70
1611-15 322.68 373.24 529.56 349.97 587.76 167.95
1616-20 335.64 374.11 521.93 380.40 587.76 154.51
1621-25 344.72 371.34 679.09 398.31 587.76 147.56
1626-30 410.81 384.65 765.57 407.96 587.76 144.07
1631-35 395.13 400.84 756.32 423.18 587.76 138.89
1636-40 409.67 406.46 805.55 451.57 587.76 130.16
1641-45 432.48 403.92 821.78 475.84 587.76 123.52
1646-50 457.09 410.25 845.07 467.21 587.76 125.80
1651-55 752.82 421.83 587.76 139.33
1656-60 702.16 393.55 587.76 149.3564
Table 6, continued.
Comparison of Price and Nominal Wage Indices in Spain, Brabant, and England, 1501-05 to 1666-70
Base: 1501-10 = 100
in quinquennial means, 1501-10 = 100
ENGLAND         ENGLAND ENGLAND ENGLAND
PBH               PBH Bldg Craftsmen: Ratio of
Composite Industrial Nominal Wage Money Wages  to
Years Price Index Price Index Index for Master PBH Ind Prices
Mason/Carpenter harmonic means
1501-05 101.43 101.18 100.00 98.83
1506-10 98.57 98.82 100.00 101.20
1511-15 103.08 105.38 100.00 94.89
1516-20 114.39 106.20 100.00 94.16
1521-25 138.72 110.14 100.00 90.79
1526-30 149.45 119.34 100.00 83.80
1531-35 147.83 119.53 100.00 83.66
1536-40 144.69 123.66 108.33 87.61
1541-45 167.69 129.00 115.00 89.11
1546-50 218.12 149.06 120.00 80.57
1551-55 261.63 178.87 140.00 78.04
1556-60 300.00 184.21 160.00 86.92
1561-65 274.79 211.88 166.67 78.66
1566-70 277.63 218.64 166.67 76.23
1571-75 281.24 218.83 170.00 77.58
1576-80 319.61 226.36 190.00 83.84
1581-85 320.58 241.84 200.00 82.7065
Comparison of Price and Nominal Wage Indices in Spain, Brabant, and England, 1501-05 to 1666-70
Base: 1501-10 = 100
in quinquennial means, 1501-10 = 100
ENGLAND         ENGLAND ENGLAND ENGLAND
PBH               PBH Bldg Craftsmen: Ratio of
Composite Industrial Nominal Wage Money Wages  to
Years Price Index Price Index Index for Master PBH Ind Prices
Mason/Carpenter harmonic means
1586-90 367.74 255.55 200.00 78.26
1591-95 395.14 254.83 200.00 78.48
1596-00 513.42 271.29 200.00 73.72
1601-05 438.12 275.98 200.00 72.47
1606-10 472.06 276.80 200.00 72.26
1611-15 506.11 286.07 200.00 69.91
1616-20 494.28 291.74 200.00 68.55
1621-25 503.14 283.63 200.00 70.51
1626-30 498.72 292.88 203.33 69.45
1631-35 577.86 288.15 226.67 78.64
1636-40 584.26 301.28 248.33 82.38
1641-45 532.37 327.60 268.33 81.89
1646-50 697.54 331.89 283.33 85.36
1651-55 571.16 350.10 296.67 84.73
1656-60 608.13 336.62 300.00 89.1266
Sources:
See sources for Tables 1 - 5.67
Table 7.
The 'Baskets of Consumables' for Southern England and Brabant:                                                                                  
The Phelps Brown & Hopkins and the Van der Wee Composite Price Indices                                                                        
                                                                            
ENGLAND:  Phelps Brown          
& Hopkins Composite Index       
                    
BRABANT: Van der Wee Composite Index                                       
FARINACEOUS Metric Quantity Price Weight/ Quantity Mean Value Weight/ Mean Value Weight/
Units in 1500 Percentage in 1451-75 Percentage in 1501-05 Percentage
in d. ster in d. gr. Brabant in 1451-75 in d. gr. Brabant in 1501-05
wheat litres 45.461
rye litres 36.369 126.000 42.404 18.24% 54.720 18.76%
barley litres 18.184
peas litres 24.243
Sub-total litres 124.257 20.80 20.00% 42.404 18.24% 54.720 18.76%
MEAT-DAIRY-FISH
sheep number 1.5
beef: salted kg 23.500 54.704 23.53% 64.840 22.23%
white herrings number 15.000
red herrings number 25.000 40.000 9.988 4.30% 11.180 3.83%
Sub-total:  meat/fish 25.00% 64.692 27.82% 76.020 26.06%
butter kg 4.536 6.25% 4.800 19.728 8.48% 23.520 8.06%
cheese kg 4.536 6.25% 4.700 5.968 2.57% 8.200 2.81%
Sub-total: dairy 12.50% 25.696 11.05% 31.720 10.87%68
The 'Baskets of Consumables' for Southern England and Brabant:                                                                                  
The Phelps Brown & Hopkins and the Van der Wee Composite Price Indices                                                                        
                                                                            
ENGLAND:  Phelps Brown          
& Hopkins Composite Index       
                    
BRABANT: Van der Wee Composite Index                                       
FARINACEOUS Metric Quantity Price Weight/ Quantity Mean Value Weight/ Mean Value Weight/
Units in 1500 Percentage in 1451-75 Percentage in 1501-05 Percentage
in d. ster in d. gr. Brabant in 1451-75 in d. gr. Brabant in 1501-05
Sub-total of group 39.00 37.50% 90.388 38.87% 107.740 36.94%
DRINK
barley malt or barley litres 163.659 23.40 22.50% 162.000 39.712 17.08% 57.040 19.55%
FUEL & LIGHT
charcoal litres 154.567 162.000 10.568 4.54% 10.160 3.48%
candles kg 1.247 1.333 7.608 3.27% 8.940 3.06%
oil litres 0.284
Sub-total 7.80 7.50% 18.176 7.82% 19.100 6.55%
TEXTILES
woollen cloth metres 0.305 1.125 24.844 10.68% 29.700 10.18%
canvas metres 0.610
linen shirting metres 0.457 1.800 17.000 7.31% 23.400 8.02%69
The 'Baskets of Consumables' for Southern England and Brabant:                                                                                  
The Phelps Brown & Hopkins and the Van der Wee Composite Price Indices                                                                        
                                                                            
ENGLAND:  Phelps Brown          
& Hopkins Composite Index       
                    
BRABANT: Van der Wee Composite Index                                       
FARINACEOUS Metric Quantity Price Weight/ Quantity Mean Value Weight/ Mean Value Weight/
Units in 1500 Percentage in 1451-75 Percentage in 1501-05 Percentage
in d. ster in d. gr. Brabant in 1451-75 in d. gr. Brabant in 1501-05
Sub-total 13.00 12.50% 41.844 18.00% 53.100 18.20%
GRAND TOTAL 104.00 100.00% 232.524 100.00% 291.700 100.00%
Farinaceous/Drink 44.20 42.50% 82.116 35.32% 111.760 38.31%
Meat/Dairy/Fish 39.00 37.50% 90.388 38.87% 107.740 36.94%
Industrial Products 20.80 20.00% 60.020 25.81% 72.200 24.75%
Total 104.00 100.00% 232.524 100.00% 291.700 100.00%70
Sources:
E.H. Phelps Brown and S.V. Hopkins, ‘Seven Centuries of the Prices of Consumables Compared with Builders’ Wage-Rates’, Economica, 23 (Nov. 1956),
reprinted in E.H. Phelps Brown and Sheila V. Hopkins, A Perspective of Wages and Prices (London, 1981),  pp. 13-59.
Herman Van der Wee, ‘Prijzen en lonen als ontwikkelingsvariabelen: Een vergelijkend onderzoek tussen Engeland en de Zuidelijke Nederlanden, 1400 - 1700’, in
Album offert à Charles Verlinden à l’occasion de ses trente ans de professoriat (Wetteren: Universum,  1975), pp. 413-35; republished in English translation as:
‘Prices and Wages as Development Variables: A Comparison between England and the Southern Netherlands, 1400-1700’, Acta Historiae Neerlandicae, 10
(1978), 58-78.71
Table 8.                                                        Price Relatives for Fuels and Components of                                               
  the Phelps Brown and Hopkins 'Basket of Consumables' (Revised Version)                                   
1451-60 to 1781-90, in decennial means                                                               
Base (1) 1451 - 1475 = 100            Base (2) 1581-90 = 100                                                            
Phelps Phelps
Brown & Brown &
Hopkins Hopkins
Basket of Basket of
Decade Charcoal Charcoal Coal Coal Timber Timber Consumables Consumables
Index Index Index Index Index Index Index Index
1451-75 1581-90 1451-75 1581-90 1451-75 1581-90 1451-75 1581-90
= 100 = 100 = 100 = 100 = 100 = 100 = 100 = 100
112.801
d. sterling
1501-10 88.26 36.88 86.25 25.36 105.72 31.08
1511-20 93.91 39.24 99.29 29.19 114.92 33.78
1521-30 95.13 39.75 102.82 30.22 153.43 45.10
1531-40 90.21 37.70 97.95 28.79 158.28 46.53
1541-50 106.84 44.65 120.64 35.46 204.84 60.21
1551-60 171.32 71.59 181.63 53.39 296.20 87.0772
Phelps Phelps
Brown & Brown &
Hopkins Hopkins
Basket of Basket of
Decade Charcoal Charcoal Coal Coal Timber Timber Consumables Consumables
Index Index Index Index Index Index Index Index
1451-75 1581-90 1451-75 1581-90 1451-75 1581-90 1451-75 1581-90
= 100 = 100 = 100 = 100 = 100 = 100 = 100 = 100
112.801
d. sterling
1561-70 187.85 78.50 179.50 52.77 286.08 84.09
1571-80 208.75 87.23 216.07 63.51 313.90 92.28
1581-90 239.30 100.00 274.61 100.00 248.99 100.00 340.18 100.00
1591-1600 254.11 106.19 260.71 94.94 295.58 118.71 430.78 126.63
1601-10 280.91 117.39 288.05 104.89 349.47 140.36 436.65 128.36
1611-20 329.71 137.78 288.17 104.94 408.73 164.16 477.82 140.46
1621-30 325.20 135.90 316.15 115.13 455.84 183.08 488.78 143.68
1631-40 332.18 138.81 354.62 129.14 494.83 198.74 558.62 164.21
1641-50 433.40 181.11 530.69 193.26 528.36 212.21 585.24 172.04
1651-60 539.62 225.50 473.71 172.51 571.15 167.90
1661-70 607.69 253.94 454.45 165.49 567.49 166.82
1671-80 593.22 247.89 502.52 183.00 555.11 163.1873
Phelps Phelps
Brown & Brown &
Hopkins Hopkins
Basket of Basket of
Decade Charcoal Charcoal Coal Coal Timber Timber Consumables Consumables
Index Index Index Index Index Index Index Index
1451-75 1581-90 1451-75 1581-90 1451-75 1581-90 1451-75 1581-90
= 100 = 100 = 100 = 100 = 100 = 100 = 100 = 100
112.801
d. sterling
1681-90 572.80 239.36 400.10 145.70 501.54 147.43
1691-1700 572.03 239.04 488.30 177.82 574.24 168.80
1701-10 685.29 286.37 535.40 194.97 603.32 177.35
1711-20 727.95 304.20 503.51 183.36 646.88 190.16
1721-30 727.95 304.20 486.87 177.30 604.49 177.70
1731-40 729.75 304.95 516.68 188.15 557.41 163.86
1741-50 757.91 316.72 545.67 198.71 593.49 174.46
coal                                                          Cambridge coal: spliced to combined charcoal index over 1586-1635multiplier = 20.15607
 coal                                                         Westminster coal: spliced to combined charcoal index over 1586-1635multiplier = 17.3983
Sources:    
charcoal and coal: The Phelps Brown Papers Collection, Archives of the British Library of Political and Economic Science (LSE Archives).  
The index numbers, computed here as decennial means, are those calculated by my reconstruction of their index, using component price weights based on the
movements of relative prices, rather than on fixed percentage shares, therefore differ from those that Phelps Brown and Hopkins published.  See n.  above.74
timber: Peter Bowden, ‘Agricultural Prices, Farm Profits, and Rents’, in Joan Thirsk, ed., The Agrarian History of England and Wales, Vol.  IV: 1500 - 1640
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,  1967), Table VI, pp.  846-850.  I have converted his original base, 1450-99= 100 (7.99s for 100 faggots) to the PBH
base of 1451-75.Money, Prices, Wages, and ‘Profit Inflation’ in Spain, the Southern Netherlands, and 
England during the Price Revolution era: 1520 - 1650 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph A:    Composite Price Indexes for Spain, Southern England, and the Southern Netherlands: 
 
  In Quinquennial Means, 1401-05 to 1645-50: with a semi-logarithmic scale   
 
Base:  mean of 1501-10 = 100 
 
Sources: see the Tables 
 
  
 
 
Graph B:    Composite Price Indexes for Spain, southern England, and the Southern Netherlands: 
 
  Quinquennial Means, 1401-05 to 1645-50: with an arithmetic scale   
 
Base:  mean of 1501-10 = 100 
 
Sources: see the Tables  
 
 
Graph C:   England, Prices and Wages, 1401 – 1750 
 
The Phelps Brown Composite Price Index (‘Basket of Consumables’), the Nominal Wage Index 
for Master Masons, and the Real Wage Wage Index for Master Masons 
 
In quinquennial means, 1401-05 to 1746-50 
 
Base = mean of 1451-75 = 100 
 
Real Wage Index (RWI) = Nominal Wage Index (NWI)/ Consumer Price Index (CPI) 
 
Sources: see the Tables  
 
 
Graph D:  Prices in England, 1451 – 1750 
 
The Phelps Brown and Hopkins Composite Price Index, and the Indexes for Grain Prices, Meat-
Dairy-Fish Prices, and Industrial Prices 
 
In quinquennial means:  1451-55 to 1749-50 
 
Base: Mean of 1451-75 = 100 
 
 
Graph E:  England, Prices and Wages, 1451 – 1750 
 
The Phelps Brown and Hopkins Composite Price Index, an Index of Industrial Prices, and 
Masons’ Wages, 1451-55 to l746-50, in quinquennial means  
 
Base: mean of 1451-75 = 100 
 
Real Wage Index (RWI) = Nominal Wage Index (NWI)/ Consumer Price Index (CPI) 
 
Sources: see the Tables 
 
 
 Graph F:  Prices and Wages in the Duchy of Brabant (southern Netherlands), 1451-1670 
 
The Van der Wee Composite or Consumer Price Index, the Nominal Wage Index for Master 
Masons, and the Real Wage Index for Master Masons: in semi-logarithmic scale 
 
In quinquennial means 1451-55 to 1666-70 
 
Base: mean of 1451-75 =100 
 
Real Wage Index (RWI) = Nominal Wage Index (NWI)/ Consumer Price Index (CPI) 
 
Sources: see the Tables 
  
 
 
Graph G:  Prices and Wages in the Duchy of Brabant (southern Netherlands), 1451-1670 
 
The Van der Wee Composite or Consumer Price Index, the Nominal Wage Index for Master 
Masons, and the Real Wage Index for Master Masons: in arithmetic scale 
 
In quinquennial means 1451-55 to 1666-70 
 
Base: mean of 1451-75 =100 
 
Real Wage Index (RWI) = Nominal Wage Index (NWI)/ Consumer Price Index (CPI) 
 
Sources: see the Tables 
 
  
 
 
Graph H:  Prices in the Duchy of Brabant (southern Netherlands), 1451-1670 
 
The Van der Wee Composite or Consumer Price Index, and the Price Indexes for Grains, Meat 
and Fish Products, and Industrial Products (arithmetic scale) 
 
In quinquennial means 1451-55 to 1666-70 
 
Base: mean of 1451-75 =100 
 
Sources: see the Tables 
 
  
 
 
 
Graph I:  Prices and Wages in the Duchy of Brabant (southern Netherlands), 1451-1670 
 
The Van der Wee Composite or Consumer Price Index, and the Price Indexes for Grains, Meat 
and Fish Products, and Industrial Products 
 
In quinquennial means 1451-55 to 1666-70 
 
Base: mean of 1451-75 =100 
 
Sources: see the Tables 
 
  
 
 
 
Graph J:  Prices and Wages in the Duchy of Brabant (southern Netherlands), 1451-1670 
 
The Van der Wee Composite or Consumer Price Index, the Composite Industrial Price Index, and 
the Nominal Wage Index for Master Masons 
 
In quinquennial means 1451-55 to 1666-70 
 
Base: mean of 1451-75 =100 
 
Sources: see the Tables  
 
 
Graph K:  Prices and Wages in Spain, 1501 – 1650 
 
Hamilton’s Composite Price Index for Spain (both silver and vellon based), the Grain Price 
Index, and the Real Wage Index for Craftsmen:  semi-logarithmic scale 
 
Base: mean of 1501-10 = 100 
 
Real Wage Index (RWI) = Nominal Wage Index (NWI)/ Consumer Price Index (CPI) 
 
Sources: see the text and the Tables 
 
 
Graph L:  Prices and Wages in Spain, 1501 – 1650 
 
Hamilton’s Composite Price Index for Spain (both silver and vellon based), the Grain Price 
Index, and the Real Wage Index for Craftsmen:  arithmetic scale 
 
Base: mean of 1501-10 = 100 
 
Sources: see the text and the Tables 